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This dissertation examines the intersection of financial resources, family demography and 
economic wellbeing of American households at transitional periods in the life course. Changes in union 
formation, the demographic composition of the population, and family structure since the latter part of the 
twentieth century have challenged existing theories on household formation, individual decision-making, 
and economic well-being (Bumpass, 1990). With the increase in woman’s labor force participation, the 
rise of cohabitation, pre-marital childbirth, and single-parent households, conventional models used to 
explain recent trends in marriage market dynamics, intra-household resource allocation, and wealth 
inequality are continuously tested, challenged, and revamped to keep pace with a society in a current state 
of demographic and economic flux.  
Chapter one focuses on early and young adulthood and the role of consumer and education loan 
debt in transitioning into coresidential relationships using a sample of youth coming of age at the turn of 
the twenty-first century and during a period of economic expansion, increased college enrollment and 
growing socioeconomic divide in marital patterns in the United States. Results suggest total debt amount 
is associated with cohabitation, increasing the odds of cohabitation over marriage and remaining single 
for both women and men. First marriage is positively associated with greater educational attainment for 
this cohort of young adults, but women with education loan debt are more likely to delay marrying and 
cohabit first. 
Chapter two (co-authored with Daniel T. Lichter) addresses the racial wealth gap by exploring the 
relationship between marriage and marital histories on wealth accumulation of older Black and White 
 women. Marital and relationship histories are strongly associated with the wealth accumulation process. 
Women who marry and stay married accumulated levels of wealth that exceeded those of other women 
with disrupted family lives.  The marriage-wealth nexus is sensitive to a women’s position in the wealth 
distribution, and decomposition analyses highlight the non-trivial role of racial disparities in marital 
histories in accounting for the racial wealth gap.   
The third and final chapter uses seven waves of individual-level data from the Health and 
Retirement Survey from 1998-2008 to analyze whether there is a causal effect of being an informal basic 
needs or financial caregiver to an aging parent on one’s health outcomes (self-assessed health and 
depression) and health behaviors (exercise and smoking). The results suggest a positive effect on 
depressive symptoms of basic needs caregiving for unmarried adult children, and that they may 
be selecting into that role because of their poor health. Manifestations of caregiving in future 
periods include, basic needs caregiving increasing the probability of smoking for married women 
and financial caregiving increases depressive symptoms for unmarried men. These findings 
suggest that the financial costs of caregiving can influence adult children’s health outcomes, in 
particular for those not currently in a marital union. 
 
Bumpass, L. (1990) What's happening to the family? Interactions between demographic and institutional 
change. Demography. 27(4):483-498.  
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her undergraduate studies, where she majored in economics. Senior year under the advisement of Dr. 
William “Sandy” Darity she studied the historical trends of self-employment among minorities in 
America during the latter part of the twentieth century as an independent research study.  Fenaba learned 
that self-employment rates for native-born African-Americans were relatively similar to Whites, yet 
African-Americans tended to operate businesses in industries with high failure rates. She also discovered 
that she wanted to pursue a career in research. It was her senior year and Professor Darity was the first 
person to ever speak with her about graduate study. Already fixated upon graduation and entering the 
workforce, she decided to work for a couple of years before returning to school. Her desire to research 
and study economic and social policy led her back to academia when she applied and was accepted to the 
2005 American Economic Association Summer Program at Duke University.  This program was designed 
to encourage underrepresented students to pursue graduate education in the social sciences. Attending the 
program helped Fenaba assess candidly her preparation for graduate study.  She quickly discovered that 
she could handle the intensity of the program, which was designed to simulate the first year of graduate 
study, and that she enjoyed researching and learning again.  
In the fall of 2006, Fenaba began graduate study at Cornell University in the Department of 
Policy Analysis and Management. While at Cornell, she has received an interdisciplinary education and 
has had the opportunity to supplement her economics training with family and social demography and 
health behaviors research. She studies the impact that financial resources and constraints such as the 
availability of credit sources, being unbanked, or heavy indebtedness has on family structure, and the 
inverse impact that family structure has on economic inequality and health disparities in the U.S. Fenaba 
studies the role of financial indicators, such as being credit constrained or heavily indebted on 
demographic outcomes; and, how does family structure and changes to family structures over time impact 
racial wealth inequalities and health disparities. She has served as a Teaching Assistant for several 
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classes, including Introduction to Statistics, Economics of the Public Sector, and Race and Public Policy, 
and as a graduate affiliate of the Cornell Population Center, received several grants to fund survey 
research and attend conferences to present her work. 
In 2008 and 2009, Fenaba returned to the AEA Summer Program, now at the University of 
California-Santa Barbara, as a teaching assistant.  Assistant teaching the Fundamentals of Econometrics 
and Research Seminar courses, she honed her skills in working with underrepresented undergraduates to 
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program, she is committed to extending opportunities, helping to carve pathways to the work she so 
thoroughly enjoys and encouraging consideration of graduate research. She is also currently a mentee of 
the AEA Pipeline program, which links minority graduate students with senior faculty members across 
the country to work on collaborative research projects. 
For the last two summers Fenaba has been asked to present an overview of family economics and 
intra-household decision-making at the MathxEconomics program sponsored by the Economic Education 
Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The program exposes high school students who 
excel in mathematics and are from underrepresented backgrounds to economics. She am not only excited 
and encouraged talking with young adults about higher education and her research interests, she also 
knows from personal experience that for many, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds, the 
idea of graduate study must be implanted, fostered, and encouraged early on. As an African-American 
woman, Fenaba is all too familiar with the lack of representation within academia having had only one 
black female professor in her many years in higher education and two black male professors, one of 
whom encouraged her to continue on for my doctorate.  The demographic composition of the professorate 
does not reflect the composition of those students coming into the academic pipeline.  Fenaba would like 
to participate in making the professorate more representative of those like her.  Most recently, Fenaba was 
inducted in the Cornell Chapter of the Bouchet Honor Society, and is both humbled and ecstatic to join 
such a prestigious group of scholars as a lifetime member. 
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DEBT, COHABITATION, AND MARITAL TIMING IN YOUNG ADULTHOOD 
Abstract 
Using data from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Study of Youth, I examine 
whether the transition to first union is influenced by a young adult’s personal debt holdings, 
above and beyond their traditional educational and labor market characteristics. I follow 
approximately 6,700 youth from early adulthood through their late 20s and compare youth who 
transition from singlehood into their first cohabitation to those who enter directly into marriage, 
utilizing a discrete-time competing risks hazard model framework.  Results suggest total debt 
amount is associated with transitioning into a cohabitating union, increasing the odds of 
cohabitation over marriage and remaining single for both women and men. Outstanding credit 
card debt increases the probability of cohabitation for young men and women, whereas education   
loan debt decreases the odds of marriage relative to remaining single and marrying for young 
women. Lastly, holding debt, independent of debt size, appears to be an independent predictor of 
first union choice in young adulthood for women. Transitioning to first marriage is positively 
associated with greater educational attainment for this cohort of young adults, but women with 
education loan debt are more likely to delay marrying and cohabit first. 
 
Key Words: credit card, cohabitation, education loan, marriage, young adulthood 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars believe that both the delay and the decline in the number of young adults 
transitioning into a marital union can be linked to the increasing difficulty of achieving full 
economic and financial independence  (Furstenberg et. al, 2004; Danziger and Rouse 2007; 
Sassler and Goldscheider 2004). Problems with entering and staying in the labor market, high 
housing costs, and the increasing influence of large student loan debts are often highlighted as 
contributing factors to this delayed and prolonged transition (Settersen and Ray 2010; Arnett 
2004). To date, there exists a sizable literature on the relationship between educational 
attainment, labor market rewards, and marital formation, especially in young adulthood. 
Numerous studies document the importance of economic wellbeing and financial stability as a 
predictor of marriage (Sweeney 2002; Sassler and Goldscheider 2004; Xie et al, 2003), yet little 
attention is paid to how consumption based measures of economic stability and socioeconomic 
status, specifically debt, shape union formation decisions.   
 Youth born in the early 1980s came of age during a period of expansive credit markets 
and increased college attendance, with changes in federal financial aid policy for post-secondary 
schooling leading to shifts away from grants towards loan aid. Analysis based on data from the 
Survey of Consumer Finances indicates a 104% increase in average credit card debt holdings 
between 1992 and 2001 for 18 to 24-year old headed households  (Draut and Silva 2004), and a 
427% increase in average education loans from 1983 to 2001 (Chiteji 2007). Over the course of 
the last three decades the union formation processes of young adults have also changed. The 
median age at first marriage continued its ascent since the late 1960s rising from 22.0 in 1980 to 
26.1 by 2010 for American women, and from 24.7 to 28.2 for men, while the share of young 
adults who married by age thirty also declined (U.S. Census Bureau 2011; Pew Research Center 
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2011). At the same time, cohabitation rates have increased for young adults. As early as 2002, 
the majority of young adult women (59%) could expect to cohabit by age twenty-four (Schoen, 
Landale, and Daniels 2007). These important trends in the financial and relationship landscapes 
suggest the need to revisit the relationship between economic resources and early union 
formation.  
This study contributes to a vast literature examining the economic determinants of union 
formation. Understanding the influence of debt on behavior in young adulthood is important not 
only because it is highly correlated with other economic resources that determine an individual’s 
financial health and because debt behaviors tend to vary over the life course (Drentea 2000), but 
also acquiring large debt loads has consequences that impact the ability to borrow and save in 
future periods (Baek and Hong 2004). Carrying a large debt load, for example, can preclude or 
delay one from accumulating savings and making future financial investments (Athreya 2001; 
Bryant 1991). These early financial behaviors may have economic consequences that reverberate 
throughout subsequent stages in the life course (Baek and Hong 2004; Drentea 2000; Mirowsky 
and Ross 1999).  My study also complements recent research that finds wealth holdings to be 
both a positive and significant predictor of marriage for cohorts of young adults coming of age 
during the mid-1980s and 90s (Schneider 2011). 
Data are from approximately 6,700 men and women from the 1997 cohort of the National 
Longitudinal Study. I follow them beginning in early adulthood through their late twenties, and 
compare youth who transition from singlehood into their first cohabitation to those who 
transition to first marriage using a discrete-time competing risks hazard model framework. I 
explore whether the transition to first union is associated with a young adult’s personal debt 
holdings, with a focus on two distinct types of credit obligations, unsecured debt (e.g. credit 
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cards, bank loans) and education loans, above and beyond the traditional educational and labor 
market characteristics of “good fortune” presumed to be necessary for marital formation (Sassler 
and Goldscheider 2004). Conceptually cohabitation and marriage are similar in practice but 
differ extensively in social and legal recognition. Previous research has shown both a direct and 
indirect link between marriage and cohabitation and the allocation and management of economic 
and financial resources within the household. This difference in the financial underpinnings of 
the two union types may contribute to the behaviors young adults exhibit within the relationship, 
and also impact their decision on transitioning from singlehood into a coresidential union type, 
similar to educational and labor market attributes.  
Gender, Economic Resources, and Marriage Formation and Marital Timing 
The importance of economic resources on union formation for men’s and women’s 
marital formation and timing decisions is well documented in the literature. Early theories of 
union formation argued that men who held a comparative advantage in the labor market 
benefitted in the marriage market from forming unions with women who specialized in 
household production as both could gain from exchanging goods from their respective markets 
(Becker 1981). It was men’s economic position and labor market returns that dictated marital 
formation. Studies consistently found that men’s educational attainment, often used as a proxy 
for labor market rewards, was positively associated with marriage (Clarkberg 1999; 
Oppenheimer et al. 1997; Sassler and Goldscheider 2004; Xie et al. 2003; Goldscheider and 
Waite, 1988; Goldstein and Kenney 2001), as was their current earnings (Clarkberg 1999, Mare 
and Winship 1991; Macdonald and Rindfuss 1981; Sweeney 2002), earnings potential (Xie et al. 
2003), employment status (Oppenheimer et al. 1997; Sassler and Goldscheider 2004), and work 
experience (Clarkberg 1999; Oppenheimer et al. 1997).  Men enrolled in post-secondary 
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programs were less likely to transition to marriage early (Hogan 1978), but accumulated 
schooling and high educational attainment increased the probability of marrying at older ages 
(Sassler and Goldscheider 2004; Thornton, Axinn, and Teachman 1995).  
For women, the relationship between their economic resources and marital patterns has 
not been as consistent. As female labor market participation increased, women with a 
comparative advantage in the labor market, e.g. who earned higher wages, were hypothesized to 
receive little benefit from heterosexual marital unions. Theoretically, Becker (1981) claimed that 
for women increased labor market rewards would negatively impact their probability of a 
marriage, as there would be no gains from trade. At the macro level studies have found evidence 
to suggest a negative relationship between labor market characteristics and marriage prospects, 
especially for white women (Blau, Kahn, and Waldfogel 2000). But empirical studies using 
micro-level data found women with greater earnings were not remaining single. The better 
educated and those with full-time employment prospects were more likely to transition to 
marriage, though sometimes after a prolonged search (Sassler and Schoen 1999; Qian and 
Preston 1993; Goldscheider and Waite 1986).  
In spite of marital formation theories outlining the role of economic resources in marital 
formation decisions, existing theoretical frameworks could not explain the rising age at first 
marriage in the U.S. Oppenheimer (1988) proposed that marital timing decisions were tied to 
men’s economic position, which she defined as the length and difficulty of their career 
development. Men who struggled in the labor market, such as low-skilled and low-wage earners, 
would be less likely to successfully transition to marriage. Studies using career stability 
trajectories as a proxy for economic stability supported Oppenheimer’s marital timing model, 
finding men with stable careers were more likely to marry (Oppenheimer et al. 1997). Low-
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skilled men have had an especially difficult time finding and maintaining employment, with both 
jobs and wages in low-skill sectors remaining stagnant and declining relative to high skilled 
employment (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993); they are also the least likely to marry (Cherlin 
2004; Gibson-Davis et al. 2005). 
Marital timing models also asserted that as women acquired skills similar to men’s, their 
standards for a spouse would become more complementary. Having an advantage in household 
production would become less valued (contrary to Becker’s model), and socioeconomic 
achievements more desirable. An individual’s economic resources mattered not only for the 
likelihood of transitioning, but also, the timing of transition. In comparison to research based on 
data from earlier cohorts of young adult adults born in the mid-1970s and earlier, recent evidence 
suggests that no longer do only men’s economic resources matter. Both male and female 
economic resources are important for marital formation (Qian and Preston 1993; Sweeney 2002). 
Consequently, women who acquired greater economic resources could subsidize their spousal 
search, prolonging it in order to find a better match. This might explain the growing 
socioeconomic divide between those who marry and those who chose to delay or opted not to 
marry, and account for the rising median age at first marriage for women and men.  
In general young adults tend to express similar sentiments with regards to perceptions of 
readiness for marriage across the social class spectrum (Gerson, 2007; Sassler and Schoen, 1999; 
Clarkberg, Stolzberg, and Waite, 1995). These include the desire to be financially established 
and economically stable by securing stable work, some savings, and decreasing their outstanding 
debt (Cherlin 2009; Manning, Longmore, and Giordano 2007; Smock, Manning, and Porter 
2005). Transitions into cohabitation and marriage, however, have not occurred uniformly across 
the population. College graduates and young adults from high-income households are less likely 
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to cohabit (Kennedy & Bumpass 2008), more likely to delay fertility and view cohabitation as a 
precursor to marriage (Sassler and Miller 2010). Young adults with college degrees, from 
households with more resources such as having older parents and parents with advanced degrees, 
tend to be more likely to successfully transition to marriage, both from being single to marriage 
and cohabitation to marriage (McLanahan and Percheski 2008; Schwartz and Mare 2005; 
McLanahan 2004; Axinn and Thornton 1992).  Given that individuals tends to sort in the 
marriage market based on similar characteristics, such as age, race, and education, coupled with 
the increasing important of female economic resources, the socio-economic divide of the 
marriage market may therefore grow even wider (Schwartz & Mare 2005; Qian 1998; Qian & 
Preston 1993; South 1991).  
Cohabitation, Marital Timing, and Economic Resources 
 
Coresiding with a partner in a sexual relationship without a legal marital commitment, or 
cohabitation, has become the modal relationship form for young adults (Sassler 2010; Amato et 
al. 2008). Between 1995 and 2002, the percentage of women aged 19 to 24 who were in a 
cohabiting relationship grew from 30% to 43%, compared with 16% to 19% for 25 to 29 year 
olds (Kennedy and Bumpass 2008). Oppenheimer (1997) argued that cohabitation became an 
adaptive state for individuals who were not necessarily substituting it for marriage, but as a 
consequence of delays due to the uncertainty of the labor market for men and women’s desires to 
pursue and first establish their career. This rise in cohabitation, along with marital delay, and the 
growing acceptance of same-sex marriage have all contributed to the deinstitutionalization of 
marriage (Cherlin 2004).  Cherlin (2004) argues that the social norms attached to marriage 
weakened, strengthening the symbolic meaning of marriage. Symbolically, marriage represents a 
finish line rather than a starting point of young adult life. As a result, it is no longer an institution 
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entered into early in adulthood, with couples building their adult lives together in a joint 
household union. Instead, there is a shift away from shared obligations and asset accumulation 
throughout one’s adult life, toward individual financial and personal responsibility.  
 Similar proxies for economic resources used to predict marital formation and marital 
timing have also been used to examine transitions into cohabitation. Studies based on data from 
the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s found educational attainment either uncorrelated or negatively 
associated with transitions into cohabitation for both women and men (Thornton, Axinn, and 
Teachman 1995; Clarkberg 1999).  Labor market earnings and earnings potential were either not 
significant or positively associated with cohabitation for both men and women (Xie et al. 2003; 
Clarkberg 1999). These findings suggest that economic underpinnings were different for the 
formation of a cohabitation compared with a marriage, and impacted not only which individuals 
would enter a cohabiting union, but also when (Sassler and Goldscheider 2004; Clarkberg 1999). 
Findings regarding attributes of union formation are summarized in Chart 1. Of note, is that is no 
study to my knowledge has examined the relationship between women’s current employment 
status and her odds of cohabitation. I will be able to test this relationship in my current analysis.  
[Chart 1 about here] 
Growth in Credit Card Debt and Education Loan Debt in Young Adulthood 
The recent Great Recession increased scholarly interest in understanding the effect of 
credit markets on individual decision-making. Since the mid-1980s to the Great Recession, 
Americans experienced almost thirty years of unprecedented availability and access to both 
unsecured and secured credit markets (Dynan and Kohn 2007; Lyons 2003; Athreya 2001). 
Many individuals, particularly those with few assets, such as the low-income, minorities, and 
young, who would have previously been shut out of these markets (Weller 2010; Mann 2009), 
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obtained credit as companies diversified their risks across households and offered more attractive 
products to increase their market share (Mann 2009; Watkins 2000). These financial innovations 
increased the debt of households that may have already had access, as well as increased the 
population of those able to gain access (Dynan 2009). General attitudes towards holding debt 
also became more favorable (Chien and Devaney 2001; Drentea 2000; Schor 1999) and average 
debt holdings increased as households borrowed against the future to finance present 
consumption (Sun and Xiao 2007; Bird, Hagstrom, and Wild 1999).  
Across all households the rise in debt was largely attributable to increases in housing 
debt. For young adults, however, the increases are in large part due to changes in the markets for 
credit card and education loan debt. Between 1992 to 2001 average credit card debt holdings of 
18 to 24 year olds increased 104%, rising from $1,461 to $2,985, compared to 38% for all 
households (Draut and Silva 2004). Demographically, there are more young adult aging through 
the period compared to previous periods, increasing the numbers of individuals with access to 
credit and available to hold credit (Chiteji 2007; Draut and Silva 2004). And from a life course 
perspective, young adulthood should be a period during which individuals should be willing to 
borrow against their future selves if they expect an increase in future earnings. Some scholars 
point to the slowdown in real wage growth, which has not kept pace with the rate of inflation, as 
an additional explanation for the rise in debt holdings, especially among this age group. The 
inability to pay off debt as easily as they thought they could when the money was originally 
borrowed increases the likelihood of rolling over debt, with compounding interest, into future 
periods (Draut and Silva 2004).   
The population of young adults with education loan debt has increased as more young 
adults entered college, a 38% increase from 1999-2008 (NCES, 2010), took longer to finish, and 
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college tuition costs increased (Fitzpatrick and Turner 2007; Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner 
2007). Recent estimates suggest that close to 66% of undergraduates received some form of 
financial aid in 2007-2008 (NCES 2010). Thirty-eight percent of this aid was received in the 
form of loans, averaging $7,100.  Post-secondary schooling would be an unattainable goal for 
many without receiving some form of financial aid or grant assistance (Fitzpatrick and Turner 
2007; Carneiro and Heckman 2002; Keane and Wolpin 2001; Kane 1996). In spite of several 
funding options available for low-income students (e.g. Pell grants, student loans) and tax 
incentives programs for those coming from middle to higher income households to assist with 
paying for college (e.g. tuition tax credits, 529 plans), the majority of financial assistance 
programs are loan based, having replaced the dominance of grant aid offered throughout the 
middle to late twentieth century (Fitzpatrick and Turner, 2007). According to the National Center 
for Education Statistics, thirty-four percent of undergraduates held federal loans in 2007 
(averaging $5,000; $3,400 subsidized and $3,200 unsubsidized), compared with twenty-seven 
percent who received Pell grants ($2,600).  The average college graduate left school with 
approximately $23,000 worth of debt in college loans in 2008; in 1996 the average debt was 
$17,000 (Hinze-Pifer and Fry 2010). This replacement of grant assistance with financial aid in 
the form of student loans means more young adults entering their adult years with a significant 
amount of debt, which can take years to pay down (King and Bannon 2002). 
Several scholars have been quick to highlight that in spite of all the tuition assistance, 
college enrollment is still an expensive undertaking for most individuals. Additional fees such as 
room and board, books, and health insurance can add up. And both qualitative research and 
survey data of young college students indicate that a majority relies on credit cards to 
supplement costs (Lyons 2008; Draut and Silva, 2004). As of 2008, only two percent of 
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undergraduates had no credit history, half held at least four credit cards (Sallie Mae 2009), and 
one in four students report using credit cards to finance their education (Draut and Silva 2004).  
Recent work on the decision to stay enrolled in college also indicates that students rank high 
financial difficulties related to college costs associated with staying enrolled (Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner, 2008). Consumer debt, coupled with educational loans accumulated while in 
school, appear to be setting many young adults up for a life in debt with the potential to impact 
subsequent phases of the life course, such as labor market earnings, homeownership, and 
potentially family formation, the focus of this study (Minicozzi 2006; Baek and Hong, 2004).1 
Existing research on debt behavior in young adulthood, both credit card debt and 
education loans, has focused largely on college students and college graduates. Early research on 
the impact of early debt acquisition on later life outcomes, such as career choice, focused on 
specialized markets, such as medical school debt and doctor’s choice of field specialty, finding 
that those finishing with larger debt loads chose fields with a higher earnings potential to a 
greater degree (Rosenblatt and Andrilla 2005; Colquitt, Zeh, Killian, and Cultrice 1996).2 
Existing empirical studies focus on college graduates of four-year institutions, yet not all young 
adults attend college and many who do start do not complete. Less than six in ten students who 
started a 4-year degree in 2001, 57%, completed in six years, and only 27.5% of 2-year students 
completed their associates within three years (NCES, 2011).  Additionally, access and utilization 
of credit markets is not limited to the post-secondary school attending population. Only 39.6% of 
18-24 year olds were enrolled in degree-granting institutions in 2008 (NCES, 2011), leaving a 
large proportion of the young adult population understudied.  
Credit card debt and education loan debt vary significantly in their structural dynamics, 
which influence their societal perceptions. Although both could be considered investment debts 
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given the stage in the life course (most young adults do not have enough income to acquire many 
of the goods they need), they differ in large part regarding how they are perceived in American 
society. Drentea (2000) refers to education loan debt as normative debt, given its attachment to 
higher education, and credit card debt as non-normative as the accumulation of credit card debt is 
associated with negative financial practices and poor fiscal management skills. Additionally, the 
structure of the two markets is widely different.3 Access to credit card debt and bank loans are 
usually based on past employment and household income measures. Credit card debt oftentimes 
carries large penalties in the form of high interest rates for a consumer who cannot or is 
unwilling to pay the full balance within a predetermined relatively short allotted period (Baek 
and Hong 2004). And, credit card debt is also absolvable in the event of financial insolvency 
(e.g. bankruptcy) in most states under U.S. Federal Chapter 7 Personal Bankruptcy Law.  
Education loans acquisition, in contrast, is inherently restricted to the post-secondary school 
attending population with receipt dependent on the source (public versus private, subsidized 
versus unsubsidized). Federal loans are means-tested, for example, and repayment is relegated 
until after school completion or school leaving.  And unlike credit card debt and other unsecured 
debts, education loans are deferrable but not absolvable in the event of financial uncertainty or 
insolvency. Additionally, in the U.S. there exist federal and local policies that can influence 
individual behavior towards debt, such as the interest payments on education loans (and 
mortgages) being tax-deductible. Empirical studies find that the American tax structure does 
influence individual portfolio behavior and incentivize individuals to hold one debt over another 
(Poterba 2001). In summary, credit card debt was easily accessible during the study period and 
average holdings are low compared with education loans. There are strong market incentives to 
pay off credit card debt faster, whereas the incentives to pay off education loan debt quickly are 
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low for the post-secondary school attending population who has them. 
The Current Study 
 The current study addresses two baseline questions: 1) What is the relationship between 
debt holdings and first coresidential union choice in young adulthood? and 2) Does the type of 
debt matter for union choice? Economists believe that young adulthood should be a period 
during which individuals should access credit markets to income smooth, essentially using debt 
to establish themselves for the future. It may be difficult to achieve other markers of adulthood 
without having secured independent financial means or established a record of financial stability. 
For example, a youth may get a job to pay down high-interest credit debt, but the job interferes 
with schooling. And if financial aid is not sufficient, individuals may use credit cards to help 
finance other areas in their life, such as paying bills or rent, or even to help extended family 
(Draut and Silvia 2004). 
 Young adults may or may not hold debt.4 They borrow debt in the current period based 
on expected future income to meet unaffordable consumption and educational needs in the 
present period (Shor 1998). The ability to establish one’s economic and financial independence 
and stability is often cited as prerequisite for marriage (Gibson et al. 2005; Smock, Manning, and 
Porter 2005).  Individual debt holdings can serve as a proxy for perceived financial readiness, 
providing a signal of which market to enter, cohabitation versus marriage, and when. The ability 
to transition to a union will depend on the relationship between an individual’s perceived 
financial readiness and their debt holdings, along with observable and unobservable 
characteristics. The debt amount is observable to the researcher, as is whether the youth forms a 
union. We are not, however, able to observe others’ perception of their financial readiness or if 
the debt holdings have been revealed to potential partners.  Financial readiness is a function of 
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the two debt parameters, credit card debt and education loan debt, a vector of observed education 
and labor market characteristics, additional characteristics such as family background and 
demographics, and unobservable factors.  If a youth chooses marriage, they have revealed their 
preferred union, as well as the ranking of relationship choices to be marriage over cohabitation 
and remaining single. In the current analysis, cohabitation and marriage are modeled as 
competing risks. An individual not only chooses to enter a union but also jointly decides the type 
of union entered, cohabitation, marriage, or remaining single. Modeling the choices as separate 
binary outcomes might misrepresent the relationship given the three states are correlated, 
interdependent events. The three choices are separate and distinct, but not substitutable events. 5 
How does debt operate in the relationship market for young adults? 
Studies indicate that the informal versus formal distinction between cohabitation and 
marriage deters cohabitors from investing in relationship-specific capital and impacts their 
behaviors within the union.  Research on intra-household resource allocation finds that whereas 
married couples pool income and manage resources jointly, cohabitors are more likely to have 
independent money management systems and split resources (Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; 
Treas 1999; Brines and Joyner 1999; Winkler 1997). Cohabitors are more likely to maintain 
separate bank accounts, for example, which have been shown to be negatively associated with 
relationship quality and commitment to the relationship (Addo and Sassler 2010).   
 The social and legal distinctions between formal marriage and informal coresidential 
relationships, cohabitation, can also impact the criteria (e.g. financial and economic support) 
individuals assign to entering a cohabiting versus marital arrangement (Oppenheimer et al. 2003; 
Sassler and Goldscheider 2004; Smock, Manning, and Porter 2005). More explicitly, in contrast 
to the marriage model proposed by Cherlin (2004), in which individuals are economically stable 
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and financially secure prior to entering a marriage, cohabitation does not share these same social 
and financial requirements. It can be viewed as an economically attractive living arrangement 
since couples often benefit from the advantages of a shared living, such as economies of scale, 
without bearing the legal and social costs of marriage. Interviews with cohabiting individuals and 
couples in major urban areas find that respondents view the arrangement as more economical 
than maintaining two separate residences (Sassler 2004), and close to a third of adults cited 
finances as a main factor in the decision to live together (Taylor 2010; see also Sassler and 
Miller (2011) for how this varies by social class).  
Given these behavioral differences, one can operationalize how debt would impact the 
allocation of resources within a marriage versus cohabitation and the decision to enter into one 
versus the other. In a marital union, debt can be considered an individual financial burden that 
one brings into the union and removes financial resources from the joint household. In a 
cohabiting union, debt remains the responsibility of the individual, decreasing only one partner’s 
resources, assuming cohabitors maintain separate financial systems. Assuming young adults 
prefer to be financially established prior to a marital union (Cherlin 2004), marriage will more 
likely if debt holdings are low and cohabitation if debt holdings are high. This is independent of 
whether the respondent has revealed their debt holdings to potential partners. The directionality 
of the association remains the same even if it is assumed that debt values are revealed, marriage 
will be more likely when an individual has found a partner willing to assume their current debt. It 
is hypothesized that the formation of a union occurs in the presence of non-zero debt holdings if 
there has been a consensus to share assets for marriage or not share assets for cohabitation 
(Schmidt 2008).  
 In addition to the total amount of outstanding debt influencing the relationship transition 
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choice, there is also reason to believe that the type of debt held by the young adult matters for a 
youth’s attractiveness in the respective relationship market. Credit card debt is most common 
among young adults, whereas education loan debt tends to comprise the largest share of a young 
adult’s asset portfolio for those who do have it. Outstanding credit card debt is a sign of 
accessible current financial resources, but is unattractive in the marriage market. A significant 
credit card debt load may act as a signal of financial unpreparedness and instability, making an 
individual an unattractive (low quality) mate in the marriage market, but not in the cohabitation 
market for which financial requirements are lower.  Youth holding a lot of credit card debt may 
fare better in the cohabitation market, for which entry is cheaper, and choose to cohabit instead 
of marrying. They may also actively seek cohabitation as a means to cost share. Therefore, credit 
card debt reduces the price of cohabitation indirectly by increasing the price of marriage.  It is 
hypothesized that transitioning to marriage with positive education loans is positively associated 
with marriage relative to cohabitation and remaining single. The ability to take on credit card 
debt will decrease transitioning time, (e.g., help defray moving costs, pay rent) and increase the 
attractiveness of cohabitation relative to remaining single.  
Education loans are considered an investment debt on what may be considered an 
appreciating asset, education. It is representative of future earnings potential and economic 
stability. Youth holding non-zero education debt are potentially attractive partners in the 
marriage market given their expected future earnings potential; however, they are also more 
likely to delay marriage, prioritizing career and financial stability over marriage (Fry 2010).  
Additionally, the structure of post-secondary enrollment (e.g. dormitory living, delayed or 
difficulties with full-time employment) may act as an indirect deterrent to union formation in 
early and young adulthood. Education loan debt indirectly deters cohabitation and marriage in 
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young adulthood. Education loans (similar to enrollment) allow an individual to prolong their 
search. Additionally, the structure of post-secondary enrollment (e.g. dormitory living, delayed 
or difficulties with full-time employment) may act as an indirect deterrent to union formation in 
early and young adulthood. Education loan debt indirectly deters cohabitation and marriage in 
young adulthood. In summary, individuals will be more willing to enter marriage, or risk-share, 
in the presence of education loans where the expected future earnings potential of the debt 
holders is positive and larger than their current net wealth. Credit card debt, alternatively, may be 
a signal of present financial independence, but also a marker of current instability and an 
indicator of future financial stability or success; individuals are less willing to share a negative 
financial asset.6 Although this analysis is not modeling an exchange model explicitly, the 
relationship market chosen may reveal a preference of not only the respondent, but the partner’s 
preferences also.  
METHOD 
Data 
The 1997 cohort of National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY97) is currently an annual 
study following a representative sample of youth living in the U.S. who were 12 to 16 years old 
as of December 31, 1996.  The original cohort is comprised of two subsamples, the baseline 
sample and a supplemental oversample of Black and Hispanic youth also born during the same 
years. After eleven rounds of data collection, 83% of the original youth were interviewed as of 
the most recently released wave (2009). The NLSY97 extensively questions youth on their labor 
market experiences, educational, familial, and relationship backgrounds. The survey also 
ascertains information on wages, income, and educational debt every survey year. Youth are first 
asked asset and debt-related questions in the survey year after their eighteenth birthday7, and 
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upon reaching their twentieth and twenty-fifth birthdays respondents were asked to complete an 
assets module containing extensive questioning of all financial and non-financial asset holdings, 
assets values, and outstanding debts. My study follows youth starting in the first survey wave 
after completing the age twenty assets module through the most recent survey year. The panel 
nature of the data allows me to follow the youth from one to eight years after the age twenty 
assessment.   
Two sample restrictions were imposed on the data. Any youth missing complete union 
history and who missed two consecutive interviews during the study period and experienced a 
union transition were removed. Second, any youth who already transitioned to a first 
cohabitation or first marriage prior to the age twenty-asset module are not included in the 
analysis. Imposing this restriction excludes 1,132 women (25.8%) and 614 men (13.3%) from 
the final analysis.8 Including youth with previous coresidential experience would increase the 
difficulty of separating out whether their debt at age twenty is independent from their previous 
relationship experience. Multiple imputation is applied to maintain maximum sample size for 
those missing information on independent variables. The final analytic sample follows 3,025 
women and 3,744 men, contributing 14,681 and 19,373 person-years to the analysis. 
Cohabitation and Marriage 
The main dependent variables are union transitions. Young adults can transition from a 
single state into first cohabitation or first marriage. Cohabitation is defined in the NLSY97 as a 
sexual relationship in which an individual resides with a person of the opposite sex with a 
minimum stay of at least one month. Respondents are asked each survey round their current 
marital status and to provide dates, month and year, of first cohabitation and first marriage. 
Debt Measures 
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For the credit card debt holdings at age twenty, the variable is coded based on responses 
to the following question: “Do [you/you or your spouse/partner] have any other debts that you 
CURRENTLY OWE MONEY ON that we have not already talked about? (Examples include 
store bills, credit cards, loans obtained through a bank or credit union, margin loans through a 
stockbroker, and other installment loans. Include credit cards only if the respondent carries a 
balance.)”   If the youth responds in the affirmative, they were then asked to provide total or 
estimated amounts. The median value is assigned to those youth who choose to only enter in a 
range (i.e., $0-$1000, assigned a value of $500). The outstanding debt values do not include debt 
from any mortgages or vehicle loans.  
 Information on educational loans was asked every survey year (by semester) for youth 
currently enrolled in any type of post-secondary or advanced degree program after high school. 
The education loan variable is created using a summated yearly figure of all the currently 
outstanding loans taken out for educational study. Youth are asked to provide values on all 
outstanding government subsidized loans and private loans. The focus of this study is 
government and private loans. The education loan debt variable is generated from the question: 
“Other than assistance you received from relatives and friends, how much did you borrow in 
government subsidized loans or other types of loans while you attended this school/institution?” 
and “How much is still owed on (this/these) loan(s)?” Similar to the credit card debt variable, the 
outstanding education loans value is computed at the time of the age 20 and age 25 assets 
module, and remains constant over the study period. Due a large concentration of zeros for both 
debt measures, the variables are logged in all analyses. 
Education and Labor Market Characteristics 
 The youth’s current educational attainment is categorized into less than a high school 
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degree, high school degree, some college, and bachelors or more. Current enrollment status is 
disaggregated between two and four-year programs, with unenrolled as the reference group. 
Including the unenrolled population in addition to the college-goers and the graduates is 
important as they too are accessing credit markets and making decisions related to relationship 
formation.  Due to small cell size, all young adults who report still being enrolled in K-12 are 
grouped with the unenrolled and those enrolled in professional degree or post-secondary 
programs with the four-year group.  Labor market controls include a measure of the youth’s 
logged annual earnings. This is a predicted earnings measure estimated from the young adults 
hourly wage earnings if they worked full-time year round. 9  Covariates used in the estimation 
equation include age and highest grade completed and their quadratics, a measure of overall 
aptitude using the results from the asvab10 test, race, and current health status. The measure was 
predicted using all available waves of the young adult pre- and post- transition. Predicted 
earnings are estimated separately for males and females.11 Additionally, measures of current 
employment status include indicators for fulltime work, having worked thirty or more weeks and 
at least 30 hours per week in the previous year.  All education and labor market explanatory 
variables are time varying. 
Additional Controls 
Additional controls included in the models consist of family background, demographic 
measures, educational attainment, and labor force attachment characteristics, all factors expected 
to impact union formation and timing. All these covariates are considered exogenous to the 
youth’s relationship type and timing decision and are time-invariant across the study period.  
Controls for family background consist of the mother and father’s educational attainment as of 
1997, whether the youth resided in a rural area at age 12, a variable equal to one if the youth 
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lived with both biological parents from birth through age fourteen, and an indicator equal to one 
if the parental respondent reported negative net wealth in the 1997 survey. Given that 
cohabitation and marital timing has been shown to vary by race and ethnicity, in addition to sex, 
in young adulthood (Addo 2011; Amato et al. 2008), the sample is categorized into four 
ethnoracial categories: non-Hispanic white (reference group), non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, and 
a small, but notable, percentage of individuals identifying as mixed race. All models control for 
whether the youth currently resides in a rural area, their birth year, age, and age squared. In order 
to gain a better perspective of the youth’s current economic and financial environment, I include 
an indicator of whether the youth has negative net worth at the start of the study period, a 
measure for bank account ownership (checking, savings, or money market).  
Analysis Plan 
To estimate the role of early debt holdings while controlling for the other covariates on 
transitioning to cohabitation and marriage in early adulthood, hazard function estimates are 
generated using maximum likelihood (Allison 1984). This modeling technique is preferable in 
that it allows for both time varying and invariant regressors in the estimation. Individuals are 
followed for every year they are at risk of transitioning from single status into a union type. For 
the competing risks (hazard) models, when the decision to cohabit or marry is jointly determined, 
multinomial logistic regressions are estimated. As the outcome can be one of two events, 
cohabitation or marriage, the hazard rates estimated here represent the conditional probability 
that a youth will transition out of singlehood into a coresidential union given the other event has 
not occurred. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level using the robust method (Huber 
1967), which assumes that observations are independent across individuals and not within.  The 
final dataset is arranged in a person-year format, with each young adult contributing an 
22 
observation for each survey year they remain single until they transition to their first union, with 
all observations after transitioning are censored. Additionally, the sample used is concentrated on 
young adults beginning at age 20 and examines first union decisions. Not only is this important 
to avoid reverse causation, prior union history influencing current debt levels, but also, it allows 
us to model the importance of financial health in the relationship market during this transitional 
phase in the life course.  All tables list the odds ratios, the antilog of the estimated coefficients. 
An odds ratio greater than one indicates an increased probability of transitioning into the union, 
and a ratio less than one signifies a decreased likelihood. All models are estimated separately for 
women and men. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 1 plots the unconditional hazard rates of transitioning to cohabitation and marriage 
by gender over the study period. At every age, both men and women have a greater hazard of 
cohabiting than marrying and women transition to cohabitation at earlier ages than men and at 
greater rates across the study period. The hazard of experiencing a first union increases with age, 
yet the hazard rates for marriage are low and exhibit a slow and steady increase over the study 
period, until the very end when they peak at age 29 for both women and men. Within the full 
sample, both men and women transition to first cohabitation to a larger extent than directly to 
marriage in early adulthood. The majority of the sample remains single over the study period: 
52% for women and 62% of the men. Women were nearly twice as likely to transition to 
cohabitation first (31%) than directly marry (16.9%), compared with 24.9% of men who cohabit 
and only 13% who marry. These transition rates are not surprising and are in line with current 
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research that also finds cohabitation to be the modal pathway to coresidential relationships in 
young adulthood (Sassler 2010). 
In general, close to thirty-four percent of the young women hold credit card debt 
(averaging $2,449), compared with twenty-eight percent of the men, (averaging approximately 
$2,702) (not shown). Figures 2 and 3 compare the rates of indebtedness and average debt 
holdings for young women and men by first union status. For both women and men, the average 
debt holdings are greatest amongst those who do experience of a transition over the study period, 
and the proportion of women holding credit card debt outnumber men in all three relationship 
categories. The difference between men and women who directly marry, however, is not 
statistically different. The rates of credit card indebtedness differ between the non-transitioners, 
those who remain single, and those who cohabit or marry; yet I find no significant difference in 
means between cohabitors and those who marry.   Female cohabitors hold the most debt on 
average, $3,290, whereas men who marry differ from their cohabiting male counterparts by just 
$65. The only significant difference between credit card debt holdings exists between women 
who remain single, $2,313, and those who transition into a first cohabitation, $3,290.  
 Where differences do emerge between cohabitors and marrieds are with education loan 
debt holdings. Not surprisingly, there are more women in the sample attending college at age 20 
at the beginning of the study period than men, (19% compared to 11% of the male sample), and 
therefore women with education loans outnumber men. Close to 34% of women held some kind 
of government or private loan averaging $12,043, compared with 22% of the men, with average 
holdings of $12,261. The average amount of outstanding education loans does not differ 
significantly by sex. Men and women who remain single have the highest average education loan 
debt, but the differences are not significantly large compared with the cohabitors or married 
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groups who also have non-zero education loan debt holdings. Last, over ten percent of the 
women in the sample report holding both credit card and education loan debt, compared with 
only six percent of the men. A little less than half of the women in the sample report not having 
either debt, but more than half of the men in the sample report having neither forms of debt, 
whereas women hold debt at higher rates in every union category. These results support Chiteji’s 
(2007) findings that the majority of young adults do not have outstanding credit card debt, with 
high debt loads concentrated amongst a minority. The weighted means values for all the 
remaining explanatory variables by first union status are listed in Appendix A. 
[Figures 2 & 3 about here] 
Competing Risks Models: The decision to cohabit or directly marry versus remain single 
 Table 1 presents the multinomial logistic regression models for women, and Table 2 for 
men. Each table includes three specifications. The set of results presented in the first column, 
Model A, includes all explanatory variables including the educational and labor market 
measures.12 The second model, B, adds in the combined credit card and education loan debt 
measure, total outstanding debt, and the third specification, Model C, enters in the continuous 
debt measures separately. Introducing debt into the model as an additional explanatory variable 
along with the youth’s educational attainment and labor market characteristics after the first 
specification allows us to test whether debt is acting as a mediator or operates independently 
from the other economic resources previously used as predictors of relationship formation. While 
debt values can independently signal an individual’s financial state, it could also work in tandem 
with other financial and economic measures to provide an overall assessment of financial health 
(see Dew and Price (2010) for a similar analysis on current cohabitors). If debt is sending its own 
independent signal on the relationship market about the respondent, there should be no 
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significant change the magnitude of the estimates on the other economic resource measures. 
The multivariate competing risks model results for the sample of young women are 
presented in Table 1. In the first specification, Model A, the estimated odds ratios indicate that 
educational attainment is positively associated with a first union transition, with the more 
educated women more likely to transition into marriage. The estimates indicate that young 
women with less than a high school have decreased odds of directly marrying, and that they are 
also more likely to cohabit than marrying as indicated by the underlined odds ratios. And while 
the magnitude of the coefficient is positive (indicating an increased likelihood of transitioning), 
there does not appear to be a significant correlation between cohabitation and women’s current 
education level. These results are consistent with the education results reported for women 
utilizing other data sources. Women with more education are more likely to marry directly, even 
among recent cohorts.  
Current enrollment in a post-secondary degree program, both two and four-year degree 
programs deter cohabitation, and four-year college enrollment decreases the probability of 
marriage. The results indicate that school enrollment is perceived as incompatible with the early 
union formation. Women who report holding full-time jobs, on the other hand, have an increased 
probability of cohabitation.  Among this recent cohort of young women, positive economic 
attributes all appear to be associated with transitioning out of singlehood into a first coresidential 
union. The estimated coefficient on the predicted annual earnings measures, although not 
significant in this specification, also suggests that women with independent and positive 
economic gains have a decreased likelihood of direct marriage. 
 [Table 1 about here] 
 With the addition of the total debt measure in the second specification, Model B, total 
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debt holdings increases the odds of transitioning to cohabitation by 2.9% (p<0.01). Conversely, 
the odds ratio on transitioning to marriage is less than one, indicating decreased odds of 
marriage; however, the relationship is not significant. It is also interesting to note that when the 
debt measure is added to the model, the magnitude of the coefficients on the other economic 
resource measures strengthen in magnitude compared to the Model A, indicating total debt 
holdings has an additive impact on the additional socioeconomic attributes in the relationship 
market, and for this recent cohort of young women is an independent predictor of union 
formation. The labor market characteristics indicate that for a 1% increase in annual earnings, a 
young woman’s odds of marriage declines 22% in any given year, whereas fulltime employment 
is now positively and significant related to transitions into a first cohabitation or direct marriage. 
 The final results, Model C, assess whether the type of debt held matters for the union 
decision choice. The competing risks models reveal that relative to remaining single, 
cohabitation is the preferred relationship choice for women with positive credit card debt. A 
percentage point increase in credit card debt is associated with a 4.6% increase in the odds of 
cohabitation. Young women with education loan debt are also more likely to transition to first 
cohabitation, but have a decreased probability of directly marrying.  The results suggest that 
women with education loan debt are not only less likely to transition to marriage, they are also 
more likely to either remain single or experience a first cohabitation. Additionally, by delineating 
by debt type this specification strengthens the positive association between holding an advanced 
degree and transitioning to one of the union types. Additional runs (not shown) indicate there 
does not exist a statistically significant interaction effect of debt type and educational attainment.  
These results highlight that the economic attributes of young women from their educational 
attainment to their labor market characteristics are associated with their first union choice, with 
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debt playing an independent role on her transition during young adulthood. The fact that debt 
influences cohabitation and deters marriage suggest as hypothesized that the financial 
underpinnings related of the two union types differ for this sample of young women, and that the 
type of union entered is sensitive to debt type. 
The regression results for young men, whose economic attributes have historically 
mattered more for union formation and marital timing are provided in Table 2. From the first 
specification, prior to the addition of the debt measures, the competing risks model indicates that 
marriage is positively and significantly related to being college educated, consistent with prior 
studies. Men with bachelor’s degrees or more are 78% more likely to directly marry than remain 
single when compared to men with only a high school degree. While previous studies found that 
current enrollment deters marriage (Sassler and Goldscheider 2004; Axinn and Thornton 1992), 
for this sample of young men being currently enrolled in a two or four-year degree program only 
significantly deters cohabitation when contrasted with the unenrolled population; the odds of 
transitioning to cohabitation are slightly highly if the young man is in a two-year secondary 
degree program, 31% less likely compared with 53% for the four-year enrollees. Additionally, 
men enrolled in 4-year degree programs are more likely to transition to marriage over 
cohabitation as indicated in Table 2 by the underlined odds ratios. Relative to the 2-year college 
enrollees, the unenrolled are more likely to transition to first cohabitation and the 4-year 
enrollees are less likely. Although enrollment tends to deter non-marital coresidential 
relationships, advanced degrees increase the probability of a transition, particularly into 
marriage.  With regards to the labor market characteristics, being employed full-time is only 
significant for transitioning into cohabitating unions.  
[Table 2 about here] 
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 The addition of the combined debt measure to the male competing risk models (Model B) 
does not significantly alter the relationships of the other measures of economic stability and 
earnings potential. Similar to the female results, total debt holdings is positively associated with 
transitioning into cohabitation relative to remaining single. Additionally, the difference between 
cohabitation and marriage is significantly different at the conventional levels (p<0.05), indicating 
that men with positive debt holdings are more likely to transition into a cohabiting union rather 
than remaining single or directly marrying. And, the magnitude of the hazards on the educational 
attainment controls are strengthened for men, with the inclusion of the debt measures indicating 
the relevance of debt as an independent assessor of union formation decisions for this sample of 
young men. From simple comparisons between Table 1 and 2, it is interesting to note the 
noticeable decrease in significant estimates on the predictor economic resource variables. Not 
only are women’s economic attributes a significant predictor of their first coresidential union, but 
to a greater degree than for this sample of young men. 
Moving across Table 2 to the final model, Model C, the odds ratios corresponding to the 
credit card debt indicate a positive correlation related to transitioning into both union types. The 
odds ratios corresponding to movements into cohabitation is weakly significant at the 10% 
significance level. The relationship with education loan debt holdings and transitioning into 
marriage is negative, but not significant. The overall odds are small and close to zero, indicating 
no sizeable impact of debt in the relationship market for men. Education loans neither decreased 
the probability of marriage, nor increased it.  For men, the results suggest that debt type does not 
have any discernable influence in the decision between the union states.  Contrary to what was 
hypothesized and the estimated odds ratios for educational attainment, for example, the financial 
underpinnings for the two union types when debt is used as a financial indicator do not appear to 
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differ for men (certainly not at the standard conventional levels of significance).  
[Table 3 about here] 
 The results presented in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the amount of debt holdings do exert 
some influence in the relationship markets for this sample of young adults. The final sets of 
results in Table 3 address the question of whether it is really a question of debt amount or simply 
having debt, the mark of indebtedness, which operates in the relationship market. The regression 
estimates highlight that it may be both for women. Young women reporting any non-zero debt 
holdings have an increased odds of cohabiting, 18.6%, and are more likely to cohabit over 
remaining single and marrying (Model A). The regression results emphasize the same 
relationships for women presented in Table 1; holding credit card debt is positively associated 
with cohabitation, and having education loan debt decreases the odds of marriage relative to 
remaining single and cohabitation. Interestingly, for the men it appears that the relationship 
between debt and a first union transition are relegated to debt amount, with no statistically 
significant relationships between holding any debt or debt type held and their probability of a 
first transition.  
DISCUSSION 
Theories on life course consumption and savings behavior posits that early and young adulthood 
is the period in which individuals would be most likely to borrow heavily relative to their 
lifetime earnings, amassing a large debt load to be paid down in later life stages (Drentea 2000; 
Baek and Hong 2004). This consumption smoothing behavior is aided by the existence of credit 
markets. It is for this reason that access to and acquisition of credit obligations should spike post-
adolescence.  The ability to establish one’s economic and financial independence is often cited as 
one of the key criteria for a successful transition to adulthood (Furstenberg et al. 2004). 
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Acquiring borrowed funds from a creditor that is not a parent can provide signals of financial 
freedom and reinforce feelings of economic liberation. This study assessed the relationship 
between debt holdings and first coresidential union choice in young adulthood and whether the 
type of debt held matters. 
 My findings suggest that debt holdings, an increasingly significant asset in many young 
adults’ asset portfolios, should be considered as a factor in union formation decisions during this 
stage in the life course. Additionally, this study presents evidence in accordance with existing 
research that economic resources still matter for relationship formation for this recent cohort of 
young adults. The fact that debt holding is positively associated with transitioning out of being 
single suggests that single life in young adulthood may be difficult to afford.  Married life, 
however, is unaffordable as well. Cohabitation presents an alternative to single life, but not 
necessarily as a substitute for a marital union for these individuals.  
These results all lend support to previous research that finds women’s economic 
attributes are increasingly important for marriage formation (Sweeney 2002; Oppenheimer 
1997). It also suggests that there exists some economic threshold for cohabitation, one that may 
differ for young men and women. My findings indicate that early union formation transition type 
and timing decisions, for marriage in particular, remain associated with measures of educational 
attainment and positive indicators of current financial health and future economic stability. The 
findings for women also support the qualitative research showing debt holdings is not a barrier to 
cohabitation but can be one to marriage (Smock, Manning, and Porter 2005).  
That I find such large gender differences suggest the economic burden that debt presents 
in a marital union is treated differently within the relationship market for men and women. These 
results are very much in line with Oppenheimer’s theory on marital timing (1988). Current trends 
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in the marriage market reflect labor market fluctuations, which have seen the rewards to high-
skilled men increase disproportionately in size to the low-skill sector’s wages. Not only are 
highly educated men more successful in the job market, but they are also successful in the 
marriage market, as they are the most likely to transition to marriage.  The returns for women 
should not be discounted, however, as transitioning to marriage is also positively associated with 
greater educational attainment. Yet in this sample of young adults, women are more likely to pay 
a penalty for their education loan debt, whereas men do not. The accrual of debt from pursuing 
greater educational attainment may thus have unintended consequences for women, contributing 
to the delay in their marital timing, and the divergent destinies of those with economic 
advantages (who can attend college without amassing much debt) and those who utilize credit 
card debt to cover life expenses (Musick 2002).  
The context of marriage in young adulthood has changed, with the decline in union 
formation not as severe when the contribution of cohabitation is taken into account.  Are young 
adults opting out of marriage, or selecting into cohabitation? These results indicate that debt 
appears to be selecting women into cohabitation. One possible explanation is that women fear 
that as a result of the higher costs of entry in the marriage market, their chances of a quality 
match might not be as great. Women with debt may be considered unattractive or poor quality in 
the marriage market, but still have some resources (ex. employment, education, access to credit) 
that can positively contribute to a nonmarital coresidential household. Alternatively, men with 
debt (credit card debt, mostly) are much more willing to transition to coresidential unions, 
cohabitation or marriage, than women, indicating that men may continue to dictate the terms of 
marital formation within this recent cohort of young adults (Sassler and Miller 2011). Given that 
men can still negotiate the terms of marriage (e.g., it’s more normative for them to initiate 
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engagement), they are willing to accept a working partner, but not one who is a potential 
financial burden on the household.  A women's economic position does appear to be a significant 
factor in marital formation, and cohabitation appears to substitute as a less-expensive option until 
they are financially ready for marriage. Alternatively, the accumulation of education loans can 
also have an unintended consequence of prolonging the marital search and producing better 
matches for these women. As Oppenheimer (1997) asserted, young adults are not necessarily 
rushing into marital unions, but instead opting to form what are now culturally accepted unions 
that offers many of the same benefits to marriage until they are ready and better quality for 
transitioning into marriage.  
As with any study there are limitations. Since I do not perform a cross-cohort trend 
analysis, I cannot really assert that debt has become increasingly important factor in the marriage 
market. Second, debt is a stock quantity, meaning that it is measured at a specific point in time. It 
is difficult to ascertain from the questioning how long it took the young adult to accumulate the 
debt recorded at the time of the survey and how long it will take them to pay it off. Additionally, 
aside for my proxy variable for being unbanked, I was not able to test for actual credit access, 
whether a youth was credit constrained, as it is not explicitly asked until later interviews, so the 
results presented reflect actions related to credit utilization. Studies from the economics of 
education literature have found that access to financial aid for post-secondary schooling is not a 
constraint for enrollment decisions (Carneiro and Heckman 2002; Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner 2008, although recent research suggest that household credit constraints may 
negatively impact children’s college enrollment decisions, see Lovenheim (2011)). Also, while I 
do not make any strong causal claims regarding my analyses, my findings provide evidence that 
debt holdings play a non-trivial role in the relationship decisions of young adults, and that debt 
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has a significant and statistically different influence on first union choice in the market for union 
formation for this cohort of young adults born between 1980 and 1984. Finally, because the 
focus is on first unions, this is not a study of non-marriage, but delayed marriage.  
Marriage as an institution has gone through significant changes during recent decades 
(Cherlin 2005). As recent as 2010, 44% of young adults aged 18-29 believed marriage is 
becoming obsolete (Pew Research Center 2010). The relationship between economic resources, 
union formation, and marital timing continues to be an area of demographic interest. Ongoing 
compositional changes in the labor market, educational market, and financial landscape are 
salient and undoubtedly impact the American household and family. This paper examines one 
specific structural factor that emerged in the last three decades within the lives of American 
youth, increasing indebtedness, and the relationship with their early union formation decisions. 
This study is an effort to understand the implications of debt accumulation in young adults’ 
relationship decisions, as it may have this unintended consequence on early coresidential union 
decisions. I have presented evidence that debt may have an independent influence on the first 
coresidential union choice, and argued that these relationships transitions are may be operating 
through the differences in debt structure of credit card and education loan debt and the financial 
requirements for what is needed to form first cohabitation versus first marriage. The last wave of 
data was gathered in 2009, so it is too early to assess the long-term cohabitation and marriage 
market impacts of the credit contractions, decreases in savings, high rates of unemployment and 
under-employment a majority of American households have had to endure as a result of the 
Great Recession.  This is, however, the first recession this cohort of youth has had to live through 
in adulthood.  It will be interesting to follow them through the next decade and compare their 
continued relationship progression now that they have aged into a period of credit contractions 
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from an expansionary one.  My study also suggest the need for additional attention be paid 
toward the role of debt on family building behaviors, not just marriage and cohabitation, but also 
fertility decisions, relationship quality, and remaining married or partnered. In order to address 
these issues, however, we need new and better forms of data capture these transitional periods in 
the lives of young adults. 
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Chart 1.  Economic Resources and Transitions to Marriage and Cohabitation: Major Findings from Previous Literature
Women Men Women Men 
Parental Resources + + - - 
Post-Secondary Enrollment - +/- - - 
Educational Attainment NS/+ + NS/+/- NS 
Earnings NS/+ + NS/+ NS/+ 
Employment NS/+/- + ? NS/+ 
Marriage Cohabitation 
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VARIABLES OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE 
Educational Attainment(ref: High School)
Less than High School 1.181 0.133 0.521 * 0.122 1.205 0.137 0.515 * 0.121 1.191 0.135 0.508 * 0.119
Some College 1.162 0.181 1.876 ** 0.377 1.151 0.181 1.884 ** 0.379 1.155 0.183 1.913 ** 0.386
Bachelors or more 1.197 0.108 1.661 ** 0.256 1.188 0.107 1.670 ** 0.258 1.215 * 0.110 1.753 ** 0.274
Enrollment Status(ref: Unenrolled)
Enrolled-2-year Program 0.801 * 0.081 0.758 0.131 0.792 * 0.080 0.761 0.132 0.796 * 0.081 0.772 0.134
Enrolled-4-year Program 0.565 *** 0.046 0.574 *** 0.078 0.543 *** 0.045 0.586 ** 0.081 0.563 *** 0.048 0.629 ** 0.087
 esimt
Labor Market Characteristics
Annual Earnings 1.051 0.135 0.793 0.090 1.072 0.138 0.782 * 0.089 1.077 0.134 0.788 0.089
Full-time Employment 1.400 *** 0.097 1.276 0.147 1.389 *** 0.097 1.282 * 0.148 1.377 *** 0.096 1.261 0.146
Debt Measures
Combined Debt Measure 1.029 ** 0.009 0.982 0.016
Credit/bank Debt 1.046 *** 0.012 1.009 0.019
Government/Private Education Loan Debt 1.008 0.010 0.950 * 0.017
 -2 log likelihood -6876.877 -6869.238 -6859.109
Chi2 352.960 363.332 383.890
df 15.751 15.408 15.350
Number of Person-Years 14,671 14,671 14,671
Number of Individuals 3,025 3,025 3,025
Note: Additional controls include race, ethnicity, maternal and paternal education, rural/urban at age 12, parent's marital status at 14, parent's net worth, current rural/urban area, have a child, age, age squared, birth year 
dummies, negative net worth at 20, and unbanked at 20;*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10; underlines denote statistically significant difference between cohabitation and marriage at p<0.05; italized indicates sig 
difference at  p<0.10 between cohabitation and marriage
Cohabitation Marriage Cohabitation Marriage Cohabitation Marriage
Table 1. Multinomial Logistic Regressions Estimating the Relationship between Debt and Transitioning into Cohabitation versus Marriage relative to Remaining Single for Young Adult Women
versus Remaining Single versus Remaining Single versus Remaining Single
Model A Model B Model C
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VARIABLES OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE 
Educational Attainment(ref: High School)
Less than High School 1.054 0.080 0.633 0.116 1.061 0.081 0.642 0.118 1.055 0.080 0.634 0.116
Some College 1.155 0.172 1.309 0.302 1.149 0.171 1.273 0.293 1.156 0.172 1.305 0.301
Bachelors or more 1.250 0.125 1.780 * 0.279 1.261 0.126 1.727 * 0.268 1.262 0.126 1.779 * 0.280
Enrollment Status(ref: Unenrolled)
Enrolled-2-year Program 0.694 * 0.073 0.818 0.162 0.682 * 0.072 0.806 0.160 0.684 * 0.072 0.817 0.162
Enrolled-4-year Program 0.474 *** 0.045 0.859 0.130 0.466 *** 0.043 0.815 0.123 0.470 *** 0.045 0.861 0.130
Labor Market Characteristics
Annual Earnings 1.450 0.331 1.582 0.944 1.469 0.334 1.595 0.952 1.464 0.335 1.568 0.939
Full-time Employment 1.320 ** 0.078 1.283 0.142 1.312 ** 0.078 1.279 0.142 1.312 ** 0.078 1.276 0.142
Debt Measures
Combined Debt Measure 1.025 * 0.009 0.989 0.016
Credit/bank Debt 1.022 0.011 1.004 0.020
Government/Private Education Loan Debt 1.015 0.012 0.959 0.021
 -2 log likelihood -8127.966 -8122.412 -8121.086
Chi2 492.863 503.936 510.126
df 5.591 5.583 5.546
Number of Person-Years 19,360 19,360 19,360
Number of Individuals 3,744 3,744 3,744
Note: Additional controls include race, ethnicity, maternal and paternal education, rural/urban at age 12, parent's marital status at 14, parent's net worth, current rural/urban area, have a child, age, age squared, birth year 
dummies, negative net worth at 20, and unbanked at 20;*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; underlines denote statistically significant difference between cohabitation and marriage at p<0.05
Cohabitation Marriage Cohabitation Marriage Cohabitation Marriage
Table 2. Multinomial Logistic Regressions Estimating the Relationship between Debt and Transitioning into Cohabitation versus Marriage relative to Remaining Single for Young Adult Men
versus Remaining Single versus Remaining Single versus Remaining Single
Model A Model B Model C
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VARIABLES OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE 
Educational Attainment(ref: High School)
Less than High School 1.191 0.135 0.516 * 0.121 1.186 0.134 0.507 * 0.118 1.051 0.080 0.648 0.119 1.062 0.081 0.642 0.118
Some College 1.165 0.182 1.871 ** 0.376 1.158 0.182 1.906 ** 0.384 1.168 0.174 1.265 0.291 1.147 0.170 1.287 0.297
  
Bachelors or more 1.211 0.109 1.645 ** 0.256 1.220 * 0.111 1.732 ** 0.272 1.278 0.128 1.679 * 0.262 1.243 0.125 1.716 * 0.273
Enrollment Status(ref: Unenrolled)
Enrolled-2-year Program 0.795 * 0.081 0.762 0.132 0.794 * 0.081 0.773 0.134 0.692 * 0.073 0.815 0.161 0.686 * 0.072 0.825 0.164
Enrolled-4-year Program 0.552 *** 0.045 0.587 ** 0.081 0.556 *** 0.047 0.627 ** 0.087 0.477 *** 0.044 0.830 0.125 0.462 *** 0.044 0.857 0.130
Labor Market Characteristics
Annual Earnings 1.058 0.139 0.789 0.088 1.057 0.139 0.784 * 0.088 1.453 0.333 1.588 0.944 1.464 0.335 1.574 0.935
Full-time Employment 1.396 *** 0.097 1.280 * 0.148 1.393 *** 0.097 1.266 0.146 1.319 ** 0.078 1.282 0.142 1.319 ** 0.078 1.283 0.142
Debt Measures
Holding Any Debt (0/1) 1.186 * 0.090 0.822 0.106 1.066 0.077 0.767 0.099
Any Credit/bank Debt (0/1) 1.256 * 0.098 0.969 0.131 0.953 0.076 0.799 0.116
Any Government/Private Education Loan Debt (0/1) 1.107 0.096 0.645 * 0.098 1.167 0.117 0.690 0.132
 -2 log likelihood -6871.850 -6865.540 -8124.338 -8121.520
Chi2 359.360 371.042 499.154 504.886
df 15.523 15.474 5.568 5.570
Number of Person-Years 14,671 14,671 19,360 19,360
Table 3. Multinomial Logistic Regressions Estimating the Relationship between Debt Indicator Variables and Transitioning into Cohabitation versus Marriage relative to Remaining Single
Cohabitation MarriageCohabitation
Note: Additional controls include race, ethnicity, maternal and paternal education, rural/urban at age 12, parent's marital status at 14, parent's net worth, current rural/urban area, have a child, age, age squared, birth year dummies, negative net worth at 20, and 
unbanked at 20;*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10; underlines denote statistically significant difference between cohabitation and marriage at p<0.05
Women Men
Model A Model BModel A
Marriage
Model B
Cohabitation Marriage
versus Remaining Single versus Remaining Single versus Remaining Singleversus Remaining Single
Cohabitation Marriage
 
 
 
  
51 
 
                                                 
1 Consumer advocates are not the only people concerned about the mounting debt households have 
accumulated over the last three decades. In February 2009, during the midst of the Great Recession, the 
U.S. Congress passed the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act to target 
the perceived predatory practices of credit companies. The new law outlined guidelines specifically aimed 
at young adults, such as restricting credit access for persons under age 21 and requiring they have 
cosigners raise credit limits or proof of independent income. There has also been action to reduce the 
education loan burden in young adulthood. Several private colleges and universities have switched the 
terms of their financial aid structures to reduce the loan burden of students and their families upon 
completion and attract competitive students who may choose a less-expensive public university over a 
more expensive private option (Hardy, Snyder, and Boccella 2007; Porter 2007). There have also been 
several calls from policy groups, politicians,1 and young adults for the federal government to forgive 
outstanding student loan debt given the difficulty millennials have had securing employment since the 
recession. Many young adults argue they are not getting the expected financial return from their 
investment or are making enough to pay back the debt burden. Most recently, the current administration 
announced plans for a student loan debt-relief plan in begin in 2012 amending repayment periods and 
lowering the threshold for their loan payment as a percentage of one’s current income.  
2 All of the descriptive studies on credit card use examined college student behavior with the exception of 
a 2006 study examining the association between debt and transitioning to parenthood, marriage, and 
homeownership for 25 to 34 year olds, in which the author finds an inverse relationship between positive 
debt holdings and transitioning into these adulthood indicators, however, they never reach conventional 
levels of significance (Chiteji 2006). 
3 In the current analysis, the focus is on non-housing debt for two reasons, homeownership is essentially 
non-existent given the age group of the sample analyzed and the few homeowners who do exists have 
either transitioned to the first coresidential relationship or were assisted financially by family and friends 
to make the purchase.  
4 There are at least two ways in which debt could directly impact union formation through individual 
decision-making. The first way is if an individual is constrained and cannot access credit to borrow (Cox 
& Jappelli, 1993). The second way is if the amount of debt held provides signals about an individual’s 
financial wellbeing to the individual and to others, which impacts their perceived readiness for 
cohabitation versus marriage. The latter is the mechanism tested in this study. 
5 Additionally, qualitative research also has shown that the decision to transition into a coresidential 
relationship is not a two-step process, with individuals first deciding to form a union and them selecting 
between cohabitation or marriage (Manning and Smock, 2005).  
6 In the framework outlined above, the relationship decision is continuous in debt size. Is it the debt or 
debt amount that matters? Schneider (2011) finds support that the symbolic presence of wealth matters for 
marriage. I argue that the amount and not the mere presence of debt will be more significant for the first 
union transition choice given how normative it became to acquire and hold debt in recent years.   
7 Youth who are classified in the survey as independent (are married) prior to their 18th birthday are also 
eligible for the assets section 
8 It also increases the average age of first cohabitation from 20.89 to 22.65 and first marriage from 22.49 
to 23.61 for women, and from 21.93 to 23.02 and first marriage from 23.42 to 23.96 for men. 
9 Previous studies argue that using a permanent income measure is incorrect on a young sample, and 
instead predicted earnings is better given the high volatility of earnings income during this stage of the 
life course (Haurin, Hendershott, & Wachter,1996; Whittington & Peters, 1996)  . 
10 Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery; respondents completed the assessment of arithmetic 
reasoning, mathematics knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and word knowledge in 1997 
52 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Earlier models included job tenure measured in weeks for the most recent job and the cumulative 
number of weeks spent in the labor force since age 14 as additional measures of economic stability, 
however, they did not change any of the substantive results so they were removed in the final runs.  
12 In the interest of parsimony, the estimated coefficients for family background and demographic controls 
are not presented in the tables.  The results across all specifications reveal that black women are less 
likely to transition to either union, Hispanic women have a lower probability of cohabiting, and having a 
child is positively associated with transitioning into cohabitation first. Maternal education increases the 
odds of cohabitation, but paternal education decreases the odds of cohabitation for young women.  
Similar to the female results, black men are also less likely to transition to both unions, and Hispanic men 
less likely to cohabit. Being raised in a rural area increases the likelihood of direct marriage, and currently 
residing in a rural area decreases cohabitation.  Men who report having a child are also more likely to 
cohabit and marry than remain single. Men who are potentially credit constrained, report having no bank 
account, are significantly more likely to transition into cohabitation.  
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CHAPTER 2: MARRIAGE, MARITAL HISTORY, AND BLACK-WHITE WEALTH 
DIFFERENTIALS AMONG OLDER WOMEN  
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates the impact of union history and marital transitions on wealth inequality 
between older Black and White women (N=7,026).  Data from the Health and Retirement Study 
show large and increasing Black-White differences in wealth.  Marital and relationship histories 
are strongly associated with the wealth accumulation process among older women.  Women who 
marry and stay married accumulated levels of wealth that exceeded those of other women with 
disrupted family lives.  The marriage-wealth nexus is sensitive to a women’s position in the 
wealth distribution. Quantile regression results suggest that racial differences in total wealth 
holdings between Black and White women exist throughout the total wealth distribution, 
whereas the relationship between current union history and wealth differentials appears to be 
significant at the lower tail and middle of the distribution. Decomposition analyses highlight the 
non-trivial role of racial disparities in marital histories in accounting for the racial wealth gap. As 
the baby boom enters their retirement years, it will be important to monitor the changing 
economic circumstances, including their accumulated wealth, of single and minority women.   
 
Keywords: Black women, decomposition, marriage, quantile regression, race, wealth 
inequality   
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INTRODUCTION 
A recently published study by the Center for Community Economic Development reported that 
the median wealth of single Black women was $100 in 2007 (Chang, 2010). The study received 
broad media coverage. For individuals unfamiliar with the history of racial disparities in U.S. 
wealth, these results might appear shocking and altogether unreal.  For scholars familiar with 
inter-group economic disparities and racial inequality, the report’s findings were anything but 
surprising.  Racial wealth gaps in America are large and persistent (Blau & Graham, 1990; 
Keister & Moller, 2000; Oliver & Shapiro, 2006).  Although the low wealth of African 
Americans received most of the press, it was the adjective single that is equally deserving of 
scholarly attention.  Indeed, rising age at first marriage, high rates of marital instability, and 
increasing non-marriage, especially within the Black community (Ellwood & Jencks, 2004), 
raise questions about the changing relationship between marital histories and wealth 
accumulation. Our study sheds new light on the role of changing marital histories in the wealth 
accumulation process among Black women – and racial disparities in wealth – at older ages. 
Our fundamental goal is to balance the current emphasis on income and employment 
histories in the wealth accumulation process by providing greater sensitivity to the role of 
widening racial and ethnic differences in family formation (Burstein, 2007).   Specifically, we 
use comprehensive wealth data and retrospective union history data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) to evaluate the magnitude and sources of wealth disparities among 
older women (i.e., aged 51 to 61) born between 1931 and 1953.  We have three objectives. First, 
we document both the level and sources of racial disparities in wealth among older middle-aged 
women, both married and unmarried.  Second, we estimate the association between marital 
histories and current wealth disparities among older Black women.  Specifically, to what extent 
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do racial differences in marital histories account for racial disparities in wealth?  Unlike previous 
studies, our statistical approach (using quantile regression models) takes into racial disparities 
across the wealth distribution.  Third, as a final heuristic exercise, we decompose black-white 
differences in wealth into shares due to differences in older women’s marital histories and other 
conventional factors.   
Understanding the sources of wealth inequality is perhaps more important than ever 
during the current period of growing inequality nationally (Neckerman & Torche, 2007; McCall 
& Percheski, 2010).  A recently-released Census report indicated that U.S. income equality is at 
its highest level since the government first began tracking household income in 1967 (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2010).  In comparison, wealth inequality has stabilized over the past decade or 
two, although the concentration of wealth at the top of the income distribution has increased, 
especially if changes in tax laws (e.g., tax rates on stock yields) are taken into account 
(Neckerman & Torche, 2007).   Today’s older women also represent the first full generation of 
older Americans who were exposed throughout their adult lives to unprecedented changes in 
American family life – later marriage, high divorce, and growing shares of remarried persons. 
THEORECTICAL BACKGROUND 
Marriage and Wealth Disparities 
Wealth provides a platform for economic opportunity (Gittleman & Wolff, 2004; Oliver & 
Shapiro 2006).  Indeed, racial differences in wealth historically are substantially larger than 
racial and ethnic differences in income or earnings (Keister & Moller, 2000).  Chang (2010) 
showed that the median wealth of married and cohabiting families was $193,000 in 2007 among 
Whites, while the comparable figure among Blacks was $47,000.  Median household wealth 
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among single Black women was only $5,000, almost all of which could be attributed to the 
ownership of motor vehicles. 
Previous studies on the White-Black wealth gap have understandably focused on earnings 
and employment histories, home ownership, saving and investment strategies, and the role of 
inherited wealth (Blau & Graham, 1990; Oliver & Shapiro, 2006; Shapiro, 2004).  Shapiro 
(2004) and Oliver and Shapiro (2006) found that home ownership and inherited wealth make up 
the largest share of the average household wealth portfolio.  However, despite higher gifted 
transfers among White households, racial disparities in intergenerational wealth transfers do not 
explain the large racial differentials in wealth (Gittleman and Wolff 2004). 
Other studies of wealth have centered on the working-age rather than retirement-age 
population, typically estimating the contribution of current or lifetime income or earnings on the 
Black-White wealth gap (Campbell & Kaufman, 2005; Barsky et al., 2002).  Black women 
clearly are doubly disadvantaged in the labor market; for them, earnings are substantially lower 
than for either Black men or White women.  Black women also spend longer periods of time in 
the labor market – retirement is often not affordable – while typically working well past the usual 
retirement age in low-paying jobs (Hogan & Perrucci, 2007).  Not surprisingly, they enter older 
ages at a large economic disadvantage. In 2009, for example, much larger percentages of elderly 
Black women were poor (21.8%) than their non-Hispanic White counterparts (8.2%) (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2010a, 2010b). 
Accumulated Wealth among Older Women:  Racial Disparities 
To date, few studies have examined the interplay of gender and racial differences in wealth at 
older ages.   Single women, especially Black and other minority women, account for a growing 
share of the retirement-age population.  The result is that a substantially higher percentage of 
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elderly women than men are unmarried and living alone; their wealth and economic well-being 
depend on their past employment and marital histories, as well as the current and past earnings of 
their husbands.  In 2009, 41 percent of all women aged 65 and older were living with spouses.  
This compares with only 28 percent among African Americans (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010c).  
Even more striking is that just 18 percent of elderly Black women were widowed, compared with 
41 percent of all elderly women.  Elderly Black women clearly are much less economically 
dependent than other women on their living or deceased husbands (i.e., his pension or Social 
Security income, or the wealth that couples have accumulated over a lifetime; see Tamborini, 
Iams, & Whitman, 2009). Recent research suggests that Black divorced women who do decide to 
retire receive significantly less in average retirement incomes than divorced White women 
(Butrica & Smith, 2012). 
To be sure, racial differentials in wealth by age 50 or older may reflect the divergent 
marital behavior of Black and White women (Burstein, 2007; Ellwood & Jencks, 2004). 
Compared with their White counterparts, single Black women often face shortages in the supply 
of “marriageable" Black partners (Hamilton, Darity, & Goldsmith, 2009; Lichter et al., 1992).  
Black women also are less likely than White women to marry and stay married (Schoen & 
Standish, 2004; Sweeney & Phillips, 2004).  Among cohabitors, Black women are less likely 
than Whites to transition into marriage; in fact, most Black cohabiting relationships today 
dissolve rather than segue into marriage, which is a general pattern that characterizes 
historically-disadvantaged populations (Lichter, Qian, & Mellott, 2006).  Remarriage rates also 
are substantially lower among Black then White women (Sweeney, 1999), which also diminish 
the lifetime asset accumulation of Black women.  
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Racial disparities in marriage and family life over the past half-century also have 
seemingly widened across birth cohorts.  Using historical census records, Stevenson and Wolfers 
(2007) reported that Blacks married at higher rates than Whites during the first half of the 
twentieth century.  Their analyses highlighted a 20-percentage point decline in Black marriage 
rates between cohorts born in the 1940’s and 1950’s.  By the mid-1950’s, the percentage of 
Whites who had ever married or were currently married exceeded the percentages among Blacks.  
White marriage rates leveled off, whereas Black marriage rates continued to decline.  The 
“retreat from marriage” among American Blacks mostly reflects changing rates of entry into 
marriage (i.e., declines in the ever-married population and increases in age at first marriage) 
rather than rising rates of divorce.  
For older middle-aged women, the economic implications of changing marriage and 
family life are both self-evident and troubling.   A large literature documents the negative 
consequences of divorce and remarriage on women’s economic status (Holden & Smock, 1991; 
Duncan & Hoffman, 1985).  Women who experienced divorce during their lifetimes are at a 
decided economic disadvantage if measured in accumulated retirement wealth (Burkhauser et al., 
1991).  For example, Schmidt and Sevak (2006) found that unmarried women had fewer assets 
than both currently married individuals and single men.   Single women on average are unable to 
accumulate the same economic and financial assets that come from stable marriages (Hirschl, 
Altobelli, & Rank, 2003).  Married couples, especially dual-earner households, can save by 
sharing space and goods (i.e., economies of scale), they can pool income and assets, risk share, 
and entertain greater flexibility with movements in and out of the labor market (Blau, Ferber, & 
Winkler, 2002).  They also benefit from social and federal policies such as spousal health 
insurance, pension plans, and social security benefits also are linked to marriage, with widows 
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being able to collect survivor benefits in the event of a husband’s death (Oppenheimer, 2000). 
Lupton and Smith (2003) found that older households, married couple families in particular, hold 
twice as much wealth as single-person households. Vespa and Painter (2010) showed that wealth 
accumulated considerable more rapidly among married women over the life course.  Individuals 
with a history of union instability – as measured by cohabitation with partners other than their 
husbands – had significantly less wealth than those who married their only cohabiting partner.  
Clearly, women’s marital histories and wealth accumulation are inextricably linked. But 
recent studies also suggest that the wealth-accumulating benefits of marriage may be distributed 
unevenly over the income distribution. Low-income Black women, for example, have less access 
than White women to men with high earnings potential, an empirical reality that highlights 
marriage as an important component of the U.S. stratification system. Economically 
disadvantaged populations are more likely than the middle-class to delay marriage, cohabit, and 
experience marital disruption and relationship churning (Cherlin, 2009; Lichter, Turner, & 
Sassler, 2010). For them, marriage is much less likely to be an economic panacea at older ages, if 
measured by the accumulation of wealth.  
Unfortunately, few empirical studies have examined racial differences in marital histories 
and their implications for wealth accumulation among middle-aged or older women.  For 
example, Holden and Kuo (1996) used data from the first wave of the HRS to examine the 
relationship between marital histories and net worth for older women (aged 51-to-61 in 1992).  
They found that couples in first marriages had significantly more assets than currently married 
couples comprised of partners who had been widowed or divorced before remarrying.  Assets 
were especially low among Black women who were currently divorced or widowed.  The net 
worth of Black divorced women was $68,700, compared with $109,600 among their White 
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counterparts.  For remarried Black women, net worth was slightly higher – $86,400.  Yet, for 
each marital history category, Black women reported fewer net assets than their White 
counterparts.  Holden and Kuo (1996) reported large racial differences in wealth, but did not 
evaluate how much of the wealth disparity was due to differences in current or past marital 
behaviors or to other sources. 
More recently, Wilmoth and Koso (2002) found that women with erratic union histories 
had significantly less accumulated wealth than those who remained married.  Their empirical 
analyses included highly refined marital histories that distinguished among never-married 
women, previous cohabitations, and multiple marriages, while also including many control 
variables linked to marital history and wealth (e.g., work characteristics, health, and 
demographic background).   Among other results, Wilmoth and Koso (2002) found that women 
who divorced once or twice accumulated 79 and 88 percent less wealth, respectively, than 
women in first marriages.  Never-married women (who are not currently cohabiting) had 86 
percent less wealth.  Neither Holden and Kuo (1996) nor Wilmoth and Koso (2002) examined 
race differences in the wealth accumulation process for women with different marital pathways 
for women of advanced ages.  More recently, Tamborini, Iams, and Whitman (2009) found that 
changes in Black women’s marital patterns, such as a marital disruption, resulted in lower social 
security receipt. 
 To summarize, our study bridges two large literatures, one on racial disparities in marital 
histories and another on racial differences in wealth accumulation.  We hypothesize: (1) that 
racial disparities in wealth are large among older women; (2) that racial differences in union 
histories contribute significantly to the racial wealth gap. The intersection of race and marriage is 
revealed in differential poverty at older ages. 
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The Current Study 
Our study makes several specific contributions to our understanding of racial and ethnic 
disparities in wealth.  First, we focus on wealth and asset accumulation among Black women, 
who arguably have been on the front line of America’s family revolution (Ellwood & Jencks, 
2004).  Second, we evaluate the extent to which racial differences in marital histories have 
accounted for racial differences in wealth accumulation among older women, ages 51 to 61. 
Third, unlike previous studies that have been limited to one wave of data from the HRS (Ulker, 
2009; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002; Holden & Kuo, 1996) or that have focused on a particular union 
transition, such as spousal death (Angel, Jimenez, & Angel 2007) or divorce (Zagorsky, 2005; 
Hoffman & Duncan, 1988), our study exploits the retrospective marital history information 
across three different cohorts of the HRS.  We thus provide up-to-date estimates of racial 
disparities in women’s wealth, as well as evaluate the changing impact of marital histories during 
a period of racial divergence in marriage and family structure. 
Wealth at older ages is shaped by marital history, but it is also affected by several 
additional key demographic, labor force, and health history characteristics. Wealth accumulation 
should be positively correlated with age, educational attainment, household income, and past and 
current labor market attachment and stability (Hirschl et al. 2003; Keister & Moller, 2002).  
Healthier individuals with little to no history of disease and chronic conditions should also fare 
better than their unhealthier counterparts (Deaton, 2002), as would religious practices which not 
only influence family formation processes, but also wealth accumulation practices also (Keister, 
2003). Additionally, geographic variation in homeownership and housing values should also 
differentially impact the wealth accumulation of older women, especially among Black women 
who are overrepresented in the South and in central cities (Woldoff & Ovadia, 2008; Allen, 
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2002). And, lastly, familial obligations and household size should also influence wealth 
accumulation and savings behavior, in particular, the number of dependents the women ever had 
(Chiteji & Hamilton, 2002).  Our analyses include indicators of each of these potential 
confounders, along with several alternative measures of marital history. 
METHOD 
Data 
The data come from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a nationally representative survey 
of older Americans. The study includes information on family structure, physical and mental 
health, income, employment status, and job history.  The original HRS consists of 51-to-61 year 
old Americans, with an oversample of African and Mexican Americans, who were interviewed 
in 1992 and followed biannually thereafter.  Approximately 12,500 individuals are drawn from 
about 7,600 households, representing a response rate of 82 percent.  If the original respondent 
was married at the time of first interview, the spouse was also interviewed and then re-
interviewed in subsequent waves. To reduce biases associated with sample attrition, the HRS 
added two additional cohorts in 1998, which they labeled the Children of the Depression 
(CODA) and War Babies (WB).  Another cohort, the Early Baby Boomers (EBB), was added to 
the HRS sample in 2004.  
Measurement 
 The HRS wealth and asset data have been shown to be comparable to data from other 
nationally representative US datasets, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the 
Surveys of Consumer Finance (Smith, 1995).  For our analysis, we used the wealth variables 
recently created by the RAND Corporation (Clair, 2010), which use bracket unfolding and 
imputation coding methods to reduce the incidence of non-response on wealth and income 
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questions.  We created our analytical sample by pooling three cross-sections of Black and White 
women from the original HRS sample interviewed in 1992, who were born between 1931-1941, 
the WB cohort interviewed in 1998, born between 1942-1947, and the EBB interviewed in 2004, 
born 1948-1953. Respondents in each cohort were aged 51-to-61 at baseline, spanned three 
consecutive cohorts from the mid-twentieth century, and born across twenty-two years. The final 
sample totals 1,473 Black and 5,553 White women, or 7,026 women in total.  
 Wealth.    For our analysis we use a continuous measure of total household net wealth. 
The variable is a summated measure of six asset categories consisting of the net dollar value of 
the primary residence (house value minus all outstanding mortgages), stock portfolios, checking 
and savings (i.e., mutual funds, investment trusts, checking or savings accounts, CDs or savings 
bonds, bonds or bond funds), net values of any vehicles, other savings, minus any outstanding 
debt.  All financial values, both income and wealth, have been adjusted to 2008 dollars.  
Differential access and utilization of the home ownership market by women and Blacks (Sykes 
2005) has also contributed to large disparities in homeownership between Black and White 
households (see Hirschl & Rank (2010) for an overview). We run all models on our net worth 
value with and without housing wealth and report the results for both.  
In preliminary analyses, wealth was estimated by allocating only fifty percent of couple 
wealth to the woman, which follows the practice of previous studies (Wilmoth & Koso, 2002). 
Arbitrarily assigning equal proportions of wealth to married women, however, seems 
incongruent with research on household bargaining models of resource allocation showing that 
women’s relative bargaining power affects how and on whom monies are spent (Lundberg & 
Pollak, 1996).  Most married men also pre-decease their wives, which means allocating fifty 
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percent of household wealth may seriously misrepresent most women’s wealth in the longer run.  
The per capita results are not provided here, but are available upon request from the authors.  
 Marital History.     We present four models ranging from a basic union history model 
based on the respondent’s current union status to a complex model that incorporates past marital 
histories similar in style to Wilmoth and Koso (2002).  Our first model, the simplest, is based on 
the current union, whether respondents are currently married or unmarried. Next, we break down 
the currently unmarried women into previously married and the never married women, given the 
significant over-representation of Black women in the never married category compared with 
White women. We then estimate a model that delineates whether previously married women are 
separated, divorced, widowed, or partnered/cohabiting. For the final model, we divide the 
currently married women into the continuously married and the remarrieds, either after divorce 
or widowhood, and separate the partnered sample into two groups, i.e., never married and 
previously married. During the baseline interview for the HRS cohort, the currently partnered 
with prior unions were not asked how these former unions dissolved, so we are unable to 
determine whether they are previously divorced, widowed, or separated.   
  In addition to these models, we include two additional marital history variables: age at 
first marriage and the total number of years spent in the longest marital union (including current 
marriage). In order to construct the latter, we calculate the age at first marriage for all women 
using the retrospective marital history questions on the starting and ending dates of each 
marriage. For women who experienced only one union, years of marriage is measured by 
subtracting age at marriage from age of divorce, death, or survey date.   
Controls.    Additional control variables include demographic, labor force, and health 
history characteristics. Women’s current age is measured in years. We include an indicator for 
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whether the respondent is foreign born and currently resides in the U.S. census-defined South.  
Religious indicators were included as additional controls; respondents could self-identify as 
Protestant, Catholic, or another religion or are a non-practitioner. Also present in the model are 
number of children ever born and completed years of education.  
In order to capture labor market effects on wealth outcomes, we use total household 
income in 2008 dollars to estimate a predicted measure of permanent income. The household 
income is measured as the sum of all salaried earnings, household capital income, pension or 
annuity payments, social security benefits, unemployment or workers compensation, any kind of 
government transfers, and any additional household income received, such as alimony or 
inheritance payments. Because a single annual report of household earnings is a poor estimate of 
lifetime earnings we create a measure of permanent income composed of the predicted values 
from a regression of the household’s current earnings on several demographic and 
socioeconomic background variables including age, education, health, number of children, birth 
cohort, migration status and corresponding spousal characteristics for those currently married 
(see Blau & Graham, 1990; Menchik & Jianakoplos, 1997). The residuals from the permanent 
income estimation equations are also included along with a quadratic term as representative of 
the household’s transitory (current) income. We also identify whether respondents are currently 
employed (omitted category), self-employed, unemployed, out of the labor force, disabled, and 
retired. Work histories are measured from self-reports of total years spent in the labor market.  
We include two measures of overall health and well-being, which acknowledge a large 
literature suggesting that married individuals tend to be healthier (Waite and Gallagher, 2000). 
The first measure is a self-assessment of health (SAH), which has been shown to be a stronger 
predictor of future mortality (Idler and Benjamini, 1997).  A second health indicator sums the 
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number of physician-diagnosed chronic health conditions. Chronic conditions include high blood 
pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, arthritis, and psychiatric or mental 
disease.  For households in which both members of the household were interviewed (i.e., married 
couples at baseline), one spouse was selected to be the financial respondent and the other was the 
familial respondent. For a few married couples, one spouse provided both financial and family 
information.  We also include an indicator variable for whether the woman was the designated 
financial respondent in the household for the survey. Lastly, we include controls for birth cohort, 
which identifies the original HRS cohort (the omitted category), the War Babies (WB), and the 
Early Baby Boomers (EBB).  
Analytic Approach 
We examine the association between union history and current wealth levels using multivariate 
regressions. Wealth distributions tend to be highly skewed as a result of extreme outliers and a 
large concentration of zero and negative values. To reduce the influence of extreme outliers, our 
models are estimated on a trimmed sample that removes the top and bottom one percent of the 
distribution. By imposing this restriction we lose 18 Blacks and 126 White women. In addition to 
OLS, we also present results from quantile regressions.  Quantile regressions allow us to 
compare the conditional mean estimates from the standard least squares regressions to those 
estimates at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles.  We believe that by presenting quantile regression 
results in addition to OLS, we will show that the wealth returns to marriage and marital history 
may vary not only by union type, but also at various points along the distribution (see Koenker 
and Hallock (2001)). 
Additionally, we employ a standard mean regression linear decomposition analysis 
(based on the OLS regression models) to estimate the contribution of racial differences in marital 
 
 
67 
 
history to the existing wealth gap. Apart from a study by Altonji and Doreszelski (2005), which 
accounted for changes in marital history and childbearing over time, no previous study to our 
knowledge has evaluated the contribution of marital history to the racial wealth gap.  The racial 
wealth gap is computed here by taking the difference between two regression equations for each 
race, ෡ܹ ௐ െ ෡ܹ ஻, where ෡ܹ ௐ ൌ ሺܺ௪ߚௐሻ  and ෡ܹ ஻ ൌ ሺܺ஻ߚ஻ሻ and w=White and b=Black.  So, 
෡ܹ ௐ െ ෡ܹ ஻  = ሺܺ௪ߚௐሻ   –  ሺܺ஻ߚ஻ሻ .  This equation can be rearranged with simple algebra to 
( തܺ௪- തܺ஻)ߚௐ+  തܺ஻(ߚௐ െ ߚ஻ሻ if the White coefficients are used as weights or ( തܺ௪- തܺ஻)ߚ஻+  
തܺௐ(ߚௐ െ ߚ஻ሻ when the Black coefficients are used as the standard. By employing this 
methodology, the racial wealth gap can be decomposed into two components, the explained 
portion, or the portion of the racial wealth gap attributable to group differences in the 
composition of observable characteristics,  ( തܺ௪- തܺ஻)ߚௐ or  ( തܺ௪- തܺ஻)ߚ஻  such as marital history, 
and an unexplained part, തܺ஻(ߚௐ െ ߚ஻ሻ or തܺௐ(ߚௐ െ ߚ஻ሻ.  
By convention, the unexplained portion reflects unmeasured compositional variables 
(differences in the coefficients), including discrimination. Using this approach, we can also 
answer the counterfactual question, “How would the wealth gap change had the relationship 
between the demographic characteristics and the wealth levels of black women been the same as 
white women, and vice versa?” Given the large racial differences in socio-demographic 
characteristics, two sets of results are presented from the decomposition analyses, one using 
black coefficients as the standard, and another using white coefficients (Altonji & Doraszelski, 
2005; Blau & Graham, 1990). The different approaches to weighting provide upper (white 
coefficients) and lower (black coefficients) bounds of total explained racial gap in wealth. By 
employing this decomposition technique, we can assess the individual contributions of the 
observables characteristics to the explained wealth gap.  
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RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents our marital history variables and additional covariates for the full sample by 
race. Our basic union model, Model 1, indicates that 68% of our total sample report being 
currently married. Of the unmarried, 28% have a previous union history and 4% never married, 
as shown in Model 2. We delineate the previously married women into four categories, separated 
(2.5%), divorced (16%), widowed (7.1%), partnered or cohabiting (2.6%). Model 3 indicates that 
only 37% of black women are currently married compared with 72% of white women (Table 1). 
Of the previously married, statistically significant differences exist between black and white 
women who are separated, 9% vs. 1.6%, divorced (2.5% vs. 14.7%), and widowed (14.2% vs. 
6.1%).  Black women are also overrepresented in the never married category (11.5%) compared 
with White women (3.2%). Among the currently married (see Model 4),  51% are continuously 
married with no prior union history, 14% remarried after divorce, and nearly 2% married again 
as widows. To further delineate different marital histories, we separate the partnered sample into 
those partnered and never married (0.4%) and partnered, but previously married (2.3%). Our 
final two marital history measures, age at first marriage and years in longest marriage, reveal 
significantly different associations for  Blacks and Whites.  White women married one year 
earlier on average than Blacks and spent seven more years in marriage, on average. 
(Table 1 about here) 
The average age of women in the sample is 54 years. Five percent of the sample is 
foreign born and Southern residents represent 36% of our total sample, and 57% and 33% of 
Blacks and Whites, respectively. Women averaged 2.7 children; Black women average slightly 
over 3.1 and the White women closer to 2.6. And lastly, over three quarters of the sampled 
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women have high school degrees or less.  Average household permanent income was 
approximately $85,000 annually at baseline. Black female households earned on average a little 
more than half the amount of their White counterparts, with the difference being statistically 
significant at the .05 level. Close to two-thirds of the sample report being Protestant, a quarter 
Catholic, and ten percent identify with some other religious affiliation. Black women are almost 
all Protestant (90%) compared with 62% of White women in the sample. 
For the first measure of health status, self-assessment of health, (SAH), Black women 
reported slightly better health than Whites in the HRS. The second health indicator sums the 
number of physician-diagnosed chronic health conditions. Scores range from 0-to-8, with a mean 
of 1.1, indicating a relatively healthy sample. Black women, however, report more chronic 
conditions than Whites, a difference that is statistically significant at the .05 level.   Almost 80% 
of the Black women were the financial respondent for the survey. This reflects the high 
percentages of unmarried individuals in the Black sample, compared with the 55% of White 
women who were financial respondents. And lastly, while the original HRS cohort represents 
over 40 percent of the total sample, the two recent cohorts, WB and EBB, contribute 
approximately thirty percent each to the final sample.  We find significant differences in 
representation by race for the HRS cohort, with a greater proportion of White women, and the 
WB cohort, which contains a higher representation of Black women. 
Our first objective is to document the large racial disparities in wealth among older 
women.  Table 2 presents the total net wealth, non-housing net wealth, and portfolio dollar 
values for our total sample, and then by race. The wealth values reported in Panel A clearly 
indicate large racial disparities.  The mean (and median) values of net wealth holdings by race 
are significantly different, with over a $200,000 mean difference ($150,000 for the median) in 
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net wealth and almost a $120,000 difference ($56,000 for the median) in non-housing net wealth.  
For Black women at the 25th percentile, both total and non-housing wealth is $0, compared with 
$68,000 and $15,000 for White women. The average value of non-housing net wealth holdings 
of Black women at the 75th percentile of their distribution are $31,000, while the median wealth 
holdings for White women at 25th percentile of their distribution are $15,000. The average Black 
woman in the top 25th percentile of the Black wealth distribution has only twice as much as the 
average White woman in the bottom 25th of their wealth distribution.   These are large 
differences by any measure. 
(Table 2 about here) 
 Panel B in Table 2 lists the portfolio composition and asset holdings that comprise the 
total net wealth values given in Panel A.  Primary homeownership, liquid savings, and vehicles 
are held in the largest percentages by older women. When separated by race, however, White 
women own every asset in greater percentages.  Their assets also have significantly higher 
average dollar values. The one exception is the other debt category; 48% of Black women are 
represented in this category compared with 43% of Whites.  This difference, however, is not 
statistically significant. The largest share of Black females’ wealth – 45% -- is the dollar value of 
their vehicles, a depreciating asset. Meanwhile, the value of their home residence comprises the 
largest share of the White females’ asset portfolio at 61%.  
OLS and Quantile Regressions  
 Our second objective focuses on the following question:  What is the relationship between 
marital history and wealth, net of other confounding variables (e.g., past employment)? Table 3 
provides coefficient estimates from the OLS models and Tables 4 and 5 present the quantile 
regression models (at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles) for total net wealth and total non-
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housing wealth.  The coefficients on the race and marital history variables for our full model, 
which includes all the demographic, family background, and socioeconomic controls, are 
presented for all four model specifications.  
(Table 3 about here) 
By definition, the racial wealth gap in total net wealth in the bivariate model (not shown) 
mimics our findings from the simple cross tabulations presented earlier, with average difference 
of close to $200,000.   At the 25th percentile, the difference in magnitude is smaller (i.e., 
$67,000), approximately $137,000 at the median, and $243,000 at the 75th percentile. All 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant.   The OLS models in Table 3 indicate that 
older Black women hold on average between $64,000 and $67,000 less net wealth than White 
women ($37,000 and $40,000 in non-housing net wealth), and as the marital history are 
disaggregated, from model (1) to (4) the Black race coefficient estimate increases in magnitude, 
always remaining significant (p<0.01). 
Moving down to the marital history results in Table 3 it is evident that compared with 
currently married women (the reference group), unmarried women hold on average less wealth 
(p<0.10). When disaggregated by previous union type in Model 3, the union history estimates 
reveal that previously married women who experience a separation (-$46,000 average total 
wealth holdings) or divorce (-$26,000) are significantly less well off compared to the currently 
married. In the last specification, Model 4, when the reference category is reduced to 
continuously married women, we see that having experienced a marital disruption negatively 
influences average net wealth holdings, with remarriage after divorce, being separated, or 
divorced all being significant and negatively associated with total wealth holdings. Interestingly, 
these negative correlations in Model 3 and 4 are not evident in the non-housing wealth samples, 
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with the differences in wealth holdings of divorced and separated women not significant at 
conventional levels, and a non-significant yet positive coefficient for widowed women. This may 
be an indication that marital wealth holdings are largely concentrated in housing value.  
Our last two marital history variables produce results that are not surprising and are in 
line with previous research. Marrying later is positively associated with financial well-being as is 
the length of time spent in marital union. Although the magnitudes on these variables are not 
large, they do indicate that they may be a contributing factor to a woman’s net wealth holdings 
by middle age. 
In the interest of parsimony, we do not present the estimated coefficients for our 
additional controls.  All are in the predicted directions.  For example, age, being foreign born, 
having more years of education, and a greater percent change in total income are all significant 
and associated with higher levels of wealth. Residing in the South, having more children, and 
more total chronic conditions are also significant and associated with lower levels of wealth. 
Years spent working is inversely related to current wealth levels, however, this result is only 
weakly significant and compared to the currently employed, retired, disabled, and those out of 
the labor force all have higher wealth levels.  
Tables 4 and 5 present the quantile regression estimates for the same four model 
specifications as the OLS results, but now we are able to assess the conditional expectation of 
race and marital status at three specific quantiles along the wealth distribution. Starting in the 
first row, Table 4 reveals that not only do Black women have less wealth on average than White 
women, but this racial disparity holds at the lower, median, and upper quantiles of the wealth 
distribution. This relationship holds even with the removal of housing wealth, as indicated in 
Table 5. The wealth differentials at the 25th percentile are small, around $18,000 for total wealth 
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and $5,000 for non-housing net wealth, yet always significant. The racial wealth difference 
increase in size at the median to approximately $35,000 ($14,000 for non-housing wealth) and 
upwards of $75,000 ($35,000) at the 75th percentile. The estimates from the OLS models are 
almost twice as large at the median estimates for both total and non-housing wealth. This 
highlights that women at the upper tail of the distribution are skewing the OLS results. 
(Tables 4 and 5 about here) 
Compared to the OLS estimates in Table 3, the quantile estimates on the marriage and 
marital history variables are statistically stronger; they show that women at the 25th and median 
quantile fare far worse than the currently married. In Model 2, the sign on the never married 
coefficient flips in sign from the OLS results, now indicating a negative relationship at the 25th, 
50th, and 75th quantile.  The negative association between never married and wealth holdings also 
holds in Model 3 with the coefficients in all three quantile regressions increasing almost 
threefold in magnitude.  It becomes statistically significant at the lower tail and median in the 
distribution when the reference category changes to continuously married women (Model 4).  In 
the non-housing wealth quantile regressions in Table 5, this pattern no longer exists, with never 
married older woman  conditional non-housing wealth holdings never statistically significant 
from their currently married or continuously married counterparts. This again highlights how 
currently married women’s wealth does appear to be concentrated in the dollar value of their 
homes. 
The marital history estimates in Model 3 reveal that women who are presently unmarried 
but who experienced a previous marital disruption due to separation, divorce, and widowhood 
have lower total wealth compared to women currently married.  This relationship is evident at 
the 25th percentile and median of the wealth distribution. In comparison, the OLS estimates in 
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Table 3 do not indicate a significant correlation between the currently married and widows and 
current cohabitors, whereas the quantile results reveal that women in these groups at the lower 
ends and middle of the distribution fare worse than their married counterparts. Additionally, 
there is only weak evidence from the magnitude of the coefficients that marital disruptions are 
significantly worse for older women at the 75th quantile. 
This relationship is also evident in the non-housing wealth regressions, in which the OLS 
estimates again indicate no significant wealth differentials in the marital history controls. The 
quantile regressions in Table 5 show significant and negative estimates for women previously 
married or with a union history at the 25th and median quantiles (Model 1). The non-housing 
wealth quantile regressions also reveal that marital history becomes less significant at the upper 
end of the wealth distribution.  In both the total wealth and non-housing wealth models (Model 
3), separated and divorced women have consistently negative coefficients across the distribution, 
whereas widowed are negative and significant at the lower ends of the distribution. In Model 2, 
when the never married are delineated from the currently unmarried, there are no significant 
differences in wealth holdings relative to the currently married with positive holdings at the 
median and upper tail of the distribution. 
In our final specification, Model 4, which fully disaggregates the marital histories, the 
relationship between marital history and wealth becomes more pronounced. Having a history of 
at least one previous marital disruption is associated with significantly less wealth than women 
who are continuously married and have no prior marital union.  These results also highlight the 
cumulative negative impact of a previous disruption. For example, results from the OLS and 
quantile regression indicate that “remarried, after divorce” is always negatively correlated with 
wealth holdings relative to the continuously married. Interestingly, remarriage appears to have 
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differential effects depending on the current union status of the woman.  Those who remarried 
after widowhood do not appear to hold wealth with any significant difference that the 
continuously married. Having a history of union disruption on average negatively impacts 
women’s wealth levels even if they eventually remarry.    The negative relationship appears to be 
independent of a woman’s place in the wealth distribution.   
From the OLS model cohabitation does not appear to be statistically correlated with 
wealth holdings. Yet, when we compare those results to the quantile regressions in Model 3, it is 
evident that current cohabitors at the 25th quantile and median of the wealth distribution have 
significantly lower wealth. Once the currently cohabiting/partnered sample is disaggregated by 
prior union history as in Model 4, we see again that experiencing a marital disruption also 
negatively influences their wealth holdings.  And finally, age at first marriage, is never 
statistically correlated with wealth holdings.  The overall conditional estimates are small in both 
Table 4 and 5 – across all four model specifications.  The quantile regression estimates for years 
spent in longest marriage are fairly congruent with the OLS estimates. Both models suggest 
statistically significant positive wealth holdings the longer the marriage, with increasing returns 
for women at the median and upper tail of the wealth distribution.  
Decomposition Analysis 
Our third objective addresses a straightforward question:  To what extent would racial disparities 
in wealth converge if Black women had the same marital histories as White women?   The 
answer can be gleaned from results of the decomposition of the Black-White wealth gap.  In 
Table 6, we present the results from all four marital history models and calculate the percentage 
of the wealth gap (differences in the predicted total wealth and non-housing wealth between 
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Black and White women) explained by the marital history variables, followed by the contribution 
of the additional demographic, labor market and health history covariates. 
(Table 6 about here) 
 The results suggest several straightforward conclusions.  The full model for total wealth 
accounts for just over one-half of the variation in the explained portion of the wealth gap (for 
both total and non-housing wealth) when using the Black coefficients and over seventy percent 
with the White coefficients.  Of this portion, the racial differences in marital status and union 
history account for roughly 8%-10% of the racial difference in wealth (3%-5% for non-housing 
wealth). 
These results have heuristic value.  They imply that Black women who followed union 
history trajectories similar to White women would have higher levels of wealth.  Specifically, the 
racial wealth gap ($201,867 for total wealth) would decrease by close to $20,600 or 10%.  At the 
same time, marital histories do not account for the currently large racial differences in wealth 
among older women. Not surprisingly and in line with previous studies (Altonji & Doraszelski, 
2005; Blau & Graham, 1990), when the regression coefficients from the White model are used as 
weights, they are able to explain more of the total wealth differential (73% compared with 54%).  
This difference highlights to a great extent how White women’s observable characteristics are 
better at explaining their wealth-creating abilities. Alternatively stated, the wealth-generating 
returns to marital history (as well as the demographic, labor and health history variables) are 
greater for White than Black women.   
The non-housing wealth decomposition indicates that marital history is able to explain 
even less of the racial wealth gap, with at most 5% of the marital history explaining the $117,343 
non-housing wealth gap. Although racial differences in marital history do not account for much 
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of the wealth divide, these results reinforce the substantive point that the explained portion of the 
racial wealth gap contributed by marital history is concentrated in housing wealth among White 
women.  It is interesting to note that the contribution of the marital history to the racial wealth 
gap appears to be independent of the model chosen. For the total wealth decomposition, the 
overall contribution of marital history ranges from 8% to 11%. This is not surprisingly given the 
fact that each model is disaggregation of the prior, i.e., Model 2 builds on Mode1, Model 3 
builds on Model 2, and Model 4 on Model 3. If anything, the largest difference should be with 
Model 4 due to the switch in reference category, however, the overall magnitude stay within less 
than a two percentage point difference between all four models. 
We also evaluated cohort differences to assess whether the racial wealth gap has changed 
as a result of cross-cohort changes in marital histories among women born during 1931-1941, 
1942-1947, and 1948 to 1953. The within-cohort wealth gaps are all positive indicating that the 
successive cohorts, WB and EBB, are saving more relative to the oldest cohort, HRS, and that 
the youngest cohort, EBB, holds the most wealth, and that the racial wealth gap has been 
diverging over time.  Not only is the EBB cohort holding more assets, but White EBBs are 
holding more assets relative to Black EBBs. There is, however, a decline in the non-housing 
wealth holdings of White women between the EBB cohort and the WB. This change when 
combined with the increase in non-housing asset holdings of Black women, actually causes the 
racial wealth gap to decrease in magnitude for this cohort.  
(Table 7 about here) 
The decomposition results of the within cohort racial wealth gaps also highlight the 
changing role of marital histories on wealth. For the oldest cohort (HRS), marital histories 
accounted for at least nine percent of the explained difference in wealth levels between the two 
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races, independent of the coefficients used as weights. This result shows that in spite of the large 
wealth differential between races, both Black and White women’s wealth returns to their union 
history characteristics were similar. For the WB cohort, the White coefficients explain more of 
the wealth differential (7 %) than when the Black coefficients are used (3 %).  For the 
decomposition of the $224,318  racial wealth gap of the youngest cohort (EBB), when using the 
Black coefficients as weights (8%), they do not do as good a job as the HRS cohort at 9% but 
surpass the WB weak performance of 3%. Whereas when White coefficients are the standard, 
they do a better job of explaining the gap than the previous two cohorts. These results suggest 
that had EBB Black women had similar marital histories as EBB White women, the racial wealth 
gap would decline by approximately $28,400, also highlighting the changing nature of racial 
disparities in marriage across the cohorts.  
The aforementioned patterns regarding the contribution of marital history are observed to 
a lesser degree in our analyses of within-cohort non-housing wealth gaps. As referenced above, 
for younger White women, presumably the decline in their non-housing wealth has been 
absorbed by the increase in the housing wealth apparent in the EBB total wealth column. And 
lastly, the contribution of marital histories to explaining the within-cohort EBB racial non-
housing wealth gap is zero for Black women. Clearly, for the youngest cohort of older Black 
women, changes in marital histories over time have slowed the wealth accumulation process. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Racial disparities in wealth are large in America society (Keister & Moller, 2000; Oliver & 
Shapiro, 2006).  Unlike previous studies, our theoretical and empirical approach to wealth 
disparities draws on a large literature that emphasizes diverging racial and ethnic patterns of 
family formation (for reviews, see Burstein, 2007; Elwood & Jencks, 2004).  We argue that 
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marital histories and wealth accumulation are inextricably linked.  For older middle-aged 
women, the so-called “retreat from marriage” – delayed marriage, cohabitation, and divorce – 
has presumably had large, negative effects over the life course on the wealth accumulation 
process.  Growing ethnoracial disparities in marriage and family life have placed Black women 
at risk of asset poverty at the same time that the large baby boom cohort has begun to enter their 
retirement years.   The main focus of this paper was to draw attention to an especially vulnerable 
population – older middle-aged Black women – who have experienced changes in union 
formation firsthand over recent decades (Ellwood & Jencks, 2004), and to assess how changing 
union dynamics have affected their economic well-being, as measured by accumulated wealth.  
This was accomplished using several waves of the HRS. 
 Our findings highlight several specific results.  First, we show large and increasing 
Black-White differences in total wealth.  The average net wealth of Black women is only about 
25 percent as large as the corresponding figure for White women.  These large wealth disparities 
clearly are in line with previous research that has found a large wealth disparity between Black 
and White households overall.  
 Second, our results show that marital and relationship histories are strongly associated 
with the wealth accumulation process among older women – both among Black and White 
women.  Whether they remarried or not, women who divorced accumulated less wealth than 
women who married and stayed married.  The marriage-wealth nexus was highly sensitive, 
however, to a women’s position in the wealth distribution. The quantile regression results 
suggest that racial differences in total wealth holdings between Black and White women exist 
throughout the total wealth and non-housing wealth distribution.  The relationship between 
current union history and wealth differentials appears to be significant at the lower tail and 
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middle of the distribution and prior union history and wealth also throughout the distribution. 
OLS regression estimates tend to mask the marital history and wealth holdings relationship for 
women located at the bottom half of the distribution. 
 Third, our decomposition analyses highlight the role of racial disparities in marital 
histories in accounting for the racial wealth gap.  If Black women had the same marital and 
relationship histories as White women, Black-White differences in wealth would be reduced by 
roughly 9%.  The wealth returns to marriage are stronger for older White women in the sample, 
and appear to be closely tied to housing value first, and a lower rate of experiencing a marital 
disruption. Obviously, our demographic accounting framework cannot make strong causal 
claims.  Whether Black women marry and stay married also is affected by their own employment 
and earnings over the life course, a larger contributing factor to the racial wealth gap as 
evidenced by our decompositions, as well as those of those of the men available to them in 
marriage.  Indeed, our results show that changing cross-cohort marriage patterns account for a 
larger share of changes in wealth among Black women than White women.  This is not 
surprising given the more rapid declines in marriage among America’s Black population.  The 
implication, of course, is that the putative economic (and wealth) benefits of marriage have 
declined over time among disadvantaged populations. Despite increasing racial and ethnic 
diversity in the US population, we are limited to Black and White women in this analysis. 
Because we are using an older sample of Americans, born 1931-1953, there is large 
heterogeneity in the Hispanic population. The Hispanic sample size is also too small to 
disaggregate into our complex union history models, with several empty cells, and we are only 
able to delineate Mexican Americans from other Hispanic.   
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As the baby boom enters their retirement years, it will be more important than ever to 
monitor the changing economic circumstances, including their accumulated wealth, among 
single and minority women.  The baby boom cohort was at the front line of family change, and 
many are now entering retirement age as single women without a large nest egg.  Although two- 
thirds of the women in our sample were currently or previously married, the current retreat from 
marriage is unlikely to slow among today’s young adults.  Indeed, the family lives and economic 
circumstances of younger cohorts of American women, including Blacks and other minorities, 
are being reshaped by family instability and relationship churning (Cherlin, 2009).  
The latest HRS cohort in our sample was interviewed in 2004, after the 2001 recession, 
but prior to the Great Recession, the housing bubble burst, and the rise in foreclosures 
nationwide.  How the racial wealth gap, especially among older women, will be affected in the 
long run by the current economic downturn is unclear. Finally, our results highlight the 
importance of considering both current marital status and union history when assessing the racial 
wealth gap, especially at older ages.  Racial disparities in wealth cannot be explained entirely or 
even mostly by current or past marriage patterns.  Instead, family and economic life are mutually 
reinforcing, which contributes to the large and perhaps growing racial differences in wealth.  
With the aging of the U.S. population and increasing longevity, a growing percentage of the lives 
of average Americans will be lived as elderly – and single – persons.   Whether or not they are 
economically situated to survive and thrive well into these later years will depend in part on the 
wealth that they have accumulated over their lifetimes.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Marital History Models, by Race
Panel A. Marital History M SD M SD M SD
Model #1
Currently married 0.675 * 0.374 0.719
Not Married 0.325 * 0.626 0.281
Model #2
Currently married 0.675 * 0.374 0.719
Previously married 0.283 * 0.511 0.249
Never married 0.042 * 0.115 0.032
Model #3
Currently married 0.675 * 0.374 0.719
Previously married:
   Separated 0.025 * 0.089 0.016
   Divorced 0.160 * 0.249 0.147
   Widowed 0.071 * 0.142 0.061
   Partnered/cohabiting 0.026 0.031 0.026
Never married 0.042 * 0.115 0.032
Model #4
Currently married:
   Continuously married 0.514 * 0.272 0.550
   Remarried, after divorced 0.144 * 0.091 0.152
   Remarried, after widowed 0.017 * 0.011 0.018
Separated 0.025 * 0.089 0.016
Divorced 0.160 * 0.249 0.147
Widowed 0.071 * 0.142 0.061
Partnered/cohabiting:
   Cohabiting, never married 0.004 0.009 0.003
   Cohabiting, previously married 0.023 0.022 0.023
Never married 0.042 * 0.115 0.032
Additional Marital History Measures
Age at first marriage 20.672 * 5.252 20.511 5.044 21.878 6.486
Years spent in longest marriage 24.477 * 11.389 25.415 10.850 18.126 12.835
Panel B. Additional Covariates
Age 54.090 2.811 54.110 2.819 53.956 2.751
Foreign born 0.048 0.046 0.060
Years of education 13.058 * 2.406 13.170 2.337 12.295 2.707
Total number of children ever had 2.689 * 1.783 2.624 1.712 3.129 2.154
Currently resides in the South 0.364 * 0.333 0.572
Protestant 0.655 * 0.621 0.890
Catholic 0.246 * 0.274 0.055
Religion-other 0.099 * 0.106 0.056
Permanent income  ($) 85,470   * 46,844  90,996      46,270  48,025        30,792  
Currently employed 0.581 0.580 0.588
Unemployed 0.022 0.021 0.031
Retired 0.124 * 0.119 0.160
Disabled 0.040 * 0.033 0.091
Out of the labor force 0.139 * 0.147 0.088
Self- employed 0.094 * 0.101 0.042
Total number of years worked 24.303 11.777 24.410 11.623 23.581 12.756
Self-assessed health (1-5) 2.508 * 1.153 2.418 1.128 3.113 1.134
Total number of chronic conditions (0-8) 1.107 * 1.148 1.051 1.120 1.481 1.258
Financial respondent 0.584 * 0.554 0.792
HRS cohort (1931-1941) 0.426 * 0.432 0.386
WB cohort (1942-1947) 0.260 * 0.259 0.261
EBB cohort (1948-1953) 0.314 0.308 0.353
N 7,026 1,473 5,553
Total Black White
Note: Sample data are from waves 1 (1992), 4 (1998), and 7 (2004) of the Health and Retirement Study; Weighted 
Sample Means; Numerical values reported in 2008 dollars; *Denotes statistically significant difference between Black 
and White samples at 5% level.
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Table 2. Total Net Wealth, Non-Housing Net Wealth, and Portfolio Composition, by Race
Panel A. Wealth Variables
Total Net Wealth
Total net wealth (average)
25th Percentile
50th Percentile (median)
75th Percentile
Total Non-Housing Net Wealth
Total Non-Housing Wealth (average)
25th Percentile
50th Percentile (median)
75th Percentile
Panel B. Asset Holdings
Mean 
Value 
Percent 
with asset
Percent of 
Net Wealth
Mean 
Value 
Percent 
with asset
Percent of 
Net Wealth
Mean 
Value 
Percent 
with asset
Percent of 
Net Wealth
Primary Residence $119,720 * 0.833 * 0.565 $46,153 0.588 0.238 $130,577 0.869 0.613
Stocks $38,046 * 0.356 * 0.063 * $8,596 0.137 0.018 $42,392 0.389 0.069
Liquid Savings $75,585 * 0.897 * 0.224 * $20,439 0.642 0.117 $83,724 0.935 0.240
Vehicles $20,312 * 0.911 * 0.347 $10,932 0.681 0.452 $21,696 0.945 0.331
Other Savings $13,029 * 0.209 * 0.032 * $4,295 0.099 0.016 $14,318 0.225 0.034
Other Debt $4,706 0.432 * 0.257 $4,334 0.477 0.021 $4,760 0.425 0.298
$142,266* $39,928 $157,371
$165,983 $31,458 $187,220
$9,361 $0 $14,756
$48,794 $5,366 $61,761
Note: Sample Data are from waves 1 (1992), 4 (1998), and 7 (2004) of from the Health and Retirement Study; Numerical values reported in 2008 dollars; *Denotes 
statistically significant difference between Black and White samples at 5% level.
FULL SAMPLE (N =7,026) BLACK SAMPLE (n =1,473) WHITE SAMPLE     (n =5,553)
$261,986* $86,081 $287,948
$48,695 $0 $67,341
$154,267 $33,349 $182,897
$347,773 $108,658 $376,780
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Table 3. Multivariate Regression Results: Coefficient Estimates of the Race and Marital History Variables from OLS Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Black -64,677*** -65,564*** -64,229*** -66,768*** -37,720*** -38,662*** -37,934*** -39,163***
[8,438] [8,488] [8,558] [8,594] [6,731] [6,770] [6,827] [6,857]
Model #1
Ref: Currently Married
Unmarried -21,648+ -3,193
[11,407] [9,098]
Model #2
Ref: Currently Married
Previously Married -20,392+ -1,859
[11,480] [9,156]
Never Married 2,384 22,325
[27,208] [21,701]
Model #3
Ref: Currently Married
Separated -45,929* -15,303
[19,784] [15,782]
Divorced -26,067+ -6,515
[13,543] [10,803]
Widowed -14,742 476
[14,190] [11,320]
Partnered/Cohabiting 24,630 31,194+
[22,902] [18,269]
Never Married 8,530 25,853
[27,615] [22,029]
Model #4
Ref: Continuously Married
Remarried, after divorced -35,029** -16,033+
[11,443] [9,130]
Remarried, after widowed -6,713 11,546
[22,796] [18,188]
Separated -55,874** -18,971
[20,109] [16,044]
Divorced -44,309** -12,268
[15,415] [12,299]
Widowed -29,147+ -4,134
[15,313] [12,218]
Cohabiting, never married 84,089 118,489*
[60,243] [48,066]
Cohabiting, previously married -7,383 10,389
[24,817] [19,801]
Never Married -23,411 20,208
[32,130] [25,636]
Age at first marriage 838.4+ 1,236* 1,464* 1,215+ 378 800 951+ 1,040+
[461] [615.7] [623] [673] [368] [491.1] [497] [537]
Years spent in longest marriage 1,423*** 1,604*** 1,743*** 1,046* 398 590+ 668* 487
[350] [396.3] [413] [516] [279] [316.1] [329] [412]
Constant -433,945*** -439,544*** -437,023*** -420,048*** -389,623*** -395,567*** -395,434*** -389,209***
[68,748] [68,989] [69,220] [69,466] [54,836] [55,025] [55,217] [55,425]
R-squared 0.259 0.259 0.260 0.261 0.181 0.181 0.182 0.183
N 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026
Total Wealth Total Non-Housing Wealth
Note: Sample Data are from waves 1 (1992), 4 (1998), and 7 (2004) of the Health and Retirement Study; All models includes additional controls including 
respondent's age, foreign born, years of education, number of children ever had, permanent and transitory income, Southern resident, current religion, current 
employment status, number of chronic conditions, self-assessed health, financial respondent, and birth cohort; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 ; 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4. Multivariate Regression Results for Total Net Wealth: Coefficient Estimates of the Race and Marital History Variables from Quantile Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Black -17,481*** -18,399*** -18,157*** -19,397*** -34,545*** -35,614*** -35,376*** -34,389*** -74,997*** -74,759*** -70,888*** -72,696***
[2,485] [1,990] [2,574] [2,887] [3,740] [3,850] [3,852] [4,744] [5,928] [10,229] [10,184] [7,384]
Model 1
Ref: Currently married
Unmarried -27,224*** -31,335*** -28,556***
[5,247] [6,325] [9,832]
Model 2
Ref: Currently married
Previously married -25,274*** -30,253*** -28,112**
[4,707] [5,471] [9,963]
Never married -11,996 -19,208+ -14,753
[8,258] [10,278] [22,306]
Model 3
Ref: Currently married
Separated -33,379*** -39,956*** -54,666
[3,225] [9,120] [38,853]
Divorced -25,516*** -30,654*** -30,009+
[4,007] [7,617] [15,688]
Widowed -22,327*** -23,584** -20,694
[3,594] [8,127] [15,134]
Partnered/cohabiting -22,094** -20,653+ 16,133
[6,858] [12,062] [39,917]
Never married -10,601 -16,211 -9,692
[7,215] [16,502] [23,750]
Model 4
Ref: Continuously married
Remarried, after divorced -19,667*** -27,778*** -37,019**
[4,724] [5,391] [13,327]
Remarried, after widowed -6,393 -424 -5,045
[9,700] [18,577] [43,142]
Separated -39,831*** -47,839*** -63,982***
[4,589] [6,314] [14,636]
Divorced -37,844*** -42,751*** -52,267***
[4,451] [11,840] [14,177]
Widowed -31,586*** -32,614** -38,702**
[4,617] [12,382] [13,009]
Cohabiting, never married -26,866 -30,034 50,508
[22,118] [69,242] [228,774]
Cohabiting, previously married -33,395*** -29,811+ -5,473
[9,275] [17,682] [33,442]
Never married -31,044*** -41,368* -41,073
[7,061] [17,404] [28,857]
Age at first marriage -133 123 153 -38 -136 124 178 -173 271 705 727 430
[133] [149.2] [169] [208] [243] [352] [481] [319] [415] [680.1] [959] [663]
Years spent in longest marriage 780 883.3*** 907*** 578.9*** 1,102*** 1,211*** 1,267*** 823.1* 1,503*** 1,632*** 1,906*** 1,288***
[92] [111] [128] [117] [164] [174] [223] [362] [335] [289] [325] [320]
Constant -115,001 -129,084*** -126,826*** -115,662*** -268,726*** -270,238*** -266,425** -262,542*** -275,114*** -296,043** -289,289** -254,873**
[21262] [29,052] [23,080] [26,983] [38,374] [47,517] [87,445] [67,791] [65,162] [109,485] [94,834] [84,965]
Pseudo r2 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.127 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.173 0.203 0.203 0.204 0.205
N 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026
Note: Sample Data are from waves 1 (1992), 4 (1998), and 7 (2004) of the Health and Retirement Study; All models includes additional controls including respondent's age, foreign born, years of education, number 
of children ever had, permanent and transitory income, Southern resident, current religion, current employment status, number of chronic conditions, self-assessed health, financial respondent, and birth cohort; *** 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 ; Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
25th Quantile 50th Quantile  (Median) 75th Quantile
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Table 5. Multivariate Regression Results for Total Non-Housing Net Wealth: Coefficient Estimates of the Race and Marital History Variables from Quantile Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Black -5,057*** -4,979*** -4,775*** -5,087*** -13,721*** -14,326 -13,570*** -14,209*** -34,203*** -34,134*** -33,277*** -33,931***
[878] [892] [1,083] [975.2] [1,825] [10,188] [1,767] [2,215] [4,195] [3,669] [4,758] [4,977]
Model 1
Ref: Currently married
Unmarried -3,788*** -6,768*** -7,962+
[1,056] [2,056] [4,261]
Model 2
Ref: Currently married
Previously married -3,598** -5,312 -7,759
[1,236] [4,788] [7,042]
Never married -536 5,501 7,667
[2,956] [17,434] [11,006]
Model 3
Ref: Currently married
Separated -4,763** -11,347*** -16,299*
[1,745] [2,983] [7,652]
Divorced -3,313** -4,199* -12,947*
[1,156] [1,997] [5,285]
Widowed -3,003** -5,907+ -4,026
[1,079] [3,319] [6,492]
Partnered/cohabiting -1,204 4,591 30,444
[2,642] [5,596] [19,817]
Never married 642 6,766 9,285
[2,755] [4,272] [11,319]
Model 4
Ref: Continuously married
Remarried, after divorced -2,955* -8,611* -15,075*
[1,334] [3,374] [7,040]
Remarried, after widowed -277 1,004 29,828
[4,672] [8,410] [19,329]
Separated -5,513*** -13,914** -23,402*
[1,348] [4,390] [9,597]
Divorced -4,905*** -8,827* -20,234**
[1,482] [3,649] [7,019]
Widowed -4,181* -9,308** -9,833
[1,632] [3,134] [7,685]
Cohabiting, never married 683 15,803 35,530
[11,268] [20,352] [38,991]
Cohabiting, previously married -3,037 -1,588 21,010
[2,330] [6,557] [22,560]
Never married -1,354 412 -856
[3,927] [5,718] [13,658]
Age at first marriage -69 -7 20 25 -28 196+ 204+ 186 -156 211 288 241
[56] [55.31] [80] [76] [112] [109.3] [115] [142] [193] [284.0] [281] [206]
Years spent in longest marriage 159*** 182*** 197*** 162*** 275*** 333** 379*** 267.9*** 379 563** 651*** 395
[33] [52.58] [39] [38] [75] [122.1] [79] [81] [151] [198.8] [191] [246]
Constant -43,102 -43,091*** -42,499*** -39,033*** -113,392*** -120,932 -118,591*** -121,610*** -222,823*** -232,302*** -205,745*** -228,487***
[33] [8,080] [6,277] [11,023] [21,057] [128,725] [19,349] [20,919] [49,703] [55,515] [43,447] [50,198]
Pseudo r2 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.114 0.164 0.164 0.165 0.166
N 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026 7,026
25th Quantile 50th Quantile  (Median) 75th Quantile
Note: Sample Data are are from waves 1 (1992), 4 (1998), and 7 (2004) of the Health and Retirement Study; All models includes additional controls including respondent's age, foreign born, years of education, 
number of children ever had, permanent and transitory income, Southern resident, current religion, current employment status, number of chronic conditions, self-assessed health, financial respondent, and birth 
cohort; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 ; Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 6. Racial Wealth Differences Attributable to Differences in Group Characteristics
Black Coeff. 
as Standard
White Coeff. 
As Standard
Black Coeff. 
as Standard
White Coeff. 
As Standard
Wealth Gap ($)
Model 1
Marital History Total $15,458 $20,578 $3,899 $5,511
Percent explained by Marital History 8% 10% 3% 5%
Demographics Total $11,882 $52,128 $5,780 $30,257
Percent explained by Demographics 6% 26% 5% 26%
Labor and Health History Total $80,743 $73,934 $64,408 $54,641
Percent explained by Labor and Health History 40% 37% 55% 47%
Full Model $108,082 $146,640 $74,086 $90,409
Percent explained by Full Model 54% 73% 63% 77%
Percent unexplained 46.46% 27.36% 36.92% 23.02%
Model 2
Marital History Total $16,180 $20,095 $4,110 $5,059
Percent explained by Marital History 8% 10% 3% 4%
Demographics Total $12,084 $51,708 $5,839 $29,861
Percent explained by Demographics 6% 26% 5% 25%
Labor and Health History Total $80,545 $73,933 $64,228 $54,643
Percent explained by Labor and Health History 40% 37% 55% 47%
Full Model $108,809 $145,736 $74,177 $89,564
Percent explained by Full Model 54% 72% 63% 76%
Percent unexplained 46% 28% 37% 24%
Model 3
Marital History Total $16,790 $22,916 $4,347 $6,993
Percent explained by Marital History 8% 11% 4% 6%
Demographics Total $11,870 $50,994 $5,740 $29,302
Percent explained by Demographics 6% 25% 5% 25%
Labor and Health History Total $81,162 $73,988 $64,662 $54,770
Percent explained by Labor and Health History 40% 37% 55% 47%
Full Model $109,822 $147,898 $74,750 $91,065
Percent explained by Full Model 54% 73% 64% 78%
Percent unexplained 46% 27% 36% 22%
Model 4
Marital History Total $17,134 $20,963 $4,471 $5,490
Percent explained by Marital History 8% 10% 4% 5%
Demographics Total $12,007 $49,466 $5,775 $28,214
Percent explained by Demographics 6% 25% 5% 24%
Labor and Health History Total $79,349 $74,154 $64,278 $55,273
Percent explained by Labor and Health History 39% 37% 55% 47%
Full Model $108,489 $144,583 $74,523 $88,977
Percent explained by Full Model 54% 72% 63% 76%
Percent unexplained 46% 28% 37% 24%
Note: Sample Data are from waves 1 (1992), 4 (1998), and 7 (2004) of the Health and Retirement Study; Numerical Values 
reported in 2008 dollars
Total Wealth Non-Housing Wealth
201,867 117,343
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Table 7. Within Cohort Racial Wealth Gap Decomposition, Total Wealth and Non-Housing Wealth for Model 1 
Total Wealth 
HRS WB EBB 
Black 
Coeff. 
White 
Coeff. 
Black 
Coeff. 
White 
Coeff. 
Black 
Coeff. 
White 
Coeff. 
Average White Wealth* 262,453 287,212 324,298 
Average Black Wealth* 74,154 84,922 99,980 
Wealth Gap ($) 188,299 202,289 224,318 
Marital History Total $17,166 $19,975 $6,854 $14,758 $17,398 $28,422 
Percent explained by Marital History 9% 11% 3% 7% 8% 13% 
Total Non-Housing Wealth 
HRS WB EBB 
Black 
Coeff. 
White 
Coeff. 
Black 
Coeff. 
White 
Coeff. 
Black 
Coeff. 
White 
Coeff. 
Average White Wealth* 140,611 176,423 164,840 
Average Black Wealth* 31,202 42,607 47,492 
Wealth Gap ($) 109,409 133,816 117,348 
Marital History Total $4,433 $7,360 $3,490 -$869 $358 $15,913 
Percent explained by Marital History 4% 7%   3% -1%   0% 14% 
Note: Sample Data are from waves 1 (1992), 4 (1998) and 7 (2004) of the Health and Retirement Study; Numerical 
Values reported in 2008 dollars 
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CHAPTER 3: INFORMAL CAREGIVING, HEALTH, AND HEALTH BEHAVIORS: 
THE ROLE OF TIME AND MONETARY TRANSFERS FROM ADULT CHILDREN TO 
AGING PARENTS- EVIDENCE FROM LONGITUDINAL DATA 
 
Abstract 
Using seven waves of individual-level data from the Health and Retirement Survey from 
1998-2010 I analyze whether there is a causal effect of being an informal caregiver to an aging 
parent on one’s health outcomes (self-assessed health and depression) and health behaviors 
(exercise and smoking). I examine two modes of providing caregiver assistance, basic needs or 
financial transfers, and the intensity of the caregiving provided. The results suggest a positive 
effect on depressive symptoms of initial basic needs caregiving for unmarried adult children, and 
that they may be selecting into that role because of their poor health. Lingering effects of 
caregiving in future periods include basic needs caregiving increasing the probability of smoking 
for married women and financial caregiving increases depressive symptoms for unmarried men. 
These findings suggest that the financial costs of caregiving can influence adult children’s health 
outcomes, in particular for those not currently in a marital union. 
 
Key Words: caregiving, depression, financial assistance, fixed effects, health behaviors, 
health outcomes 
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INTRODUCTION 
The US population is experiencing a demographic transition in which a growing percentage of 
the US population is aging, coinciding with greater life expectancies for both men and women. 
(Lubitz et al, 2003; CBO, 2004) This population shift has more Americans living out a 
significant proportion of their life as elderly adults, who may potentially require long term 
assisted care (Wolff & Kasper, 2006). After spouses, adult children play a critical role in the long 
term care of the elderly (Stone, Cafferata, & Sangl, 1987).  In 2007, familial caregivers spent on 
average $5,531 out-of-pocket and provided an average of 21 hours per week to adults with ADLs 
(AARP, 2008).  
This paper explores the relationship between informal caregiving (unpaid for their 
services) by an adult child to an elderly parent and the effect it has on the caregiver’s health and 
health behaviors. There is a particular focus on the difference between providing assistance with 
activities of daily living (ADL) versus financial transfers, as previous researchers find positive 
correlation exists between intensity and quantity of assistance provided and magnitude of health 
effects to the caregiver (Pinquart & Sorensen, 2003; Vitaliano, Zhang, & Scanlan, 2003). Using 
seven waves of panel data that spans ten years from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), I 
analyze informal caregiving measures in which a child may direct either time or money to their 
mother as a form of assistance. By also estimating the lagged effect of the informal caregiver 
role, I am able to assess not only the initial effect on health, but also whether there exists a 
delayed effect that manifest in the future. 
This study addresses how much of an influence physical interactions with the aging 
process, as proxied by the type and extent of caregiving, can have on personal healthcare and 
health behaviors in later life. Many adult children find themselves in the precarious situation of 
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caring for an aging parent as the aging population grows and lives longer (Preston, 1984). 
Although the extent of their interactions and reasons for the partnerships can vary across parent-
child groupings (vanHoutven & Norton, 2007; White-Means & Chang, 1991), the most prevalent 
causes for an adult child becoming a parent’s caregiver are the decline in health and mental 
capabilities as one ages (Zhu et al., 2003) and the cost of secondary care or nursing homes 
(McGarry, 1998).  Additionally, with longer life expectancies older Americans are also finding it 
difficult to support themselves once their retirement savings are depleted, and must rely on 
financial assistance from family and friends to supplement social security benefits and medical 
expenditures, for example, to assist with the costs of aging (Swartz, 2011; Wakabayashi & 
Donato, 2006). As both parents and children age, the role of dependence may shift, leading to 
interesting role reversals influencing the physical and mental health of not only the parent, but 
also the caregiver, e.g. adult child (Pavalko & Woodbury, 2000). Additionally, this newly 
assumed role by the adult child may not be very well-defined and can take on several varied 
dimensions, from running errands, such as buying groceries, to very complex relationships such 
as assisting an incapacitated parent with activities of daily living such as bathing or getting into 
and out of bed, and providing financial assistance for medicine or food. Examining an adult 
child’s health from adulthood into old age is important for understanding how some adults may 
make choices about their own healthcare, form attitudes towards certain health behaviors, and 
invest in long-term care. Additionally, maintaining ties with a biological parent as they age and 
subsequently die may provide invaluable networks of information in addition to the short-term 
effects on the adult child’s own health.  
With the use of panel data estimation techniques, I tease out the causal effect of initial 
caregiving and the related spillover effects of aging health information on the adult child’s health 
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and health behaviors. Previous research has shown that maternal caregiving is one of the most 
common given the longer life expectancy of women, and higher chances of widowhood (Van 
Houtven & Norton, 2008). The analysis is restricted to caregiving of a biological mother or 
maternal figure. 
Previous studies on Informal Caregiving, Familial Networks, and Health Outcomes 
Existing literature on adult informal caregiving has tended to concentrate on the health of 
the parent (i.e., recipient of the care), decision-making amongst family members on who will 
provide care (Pezzin & Schone, 1997; Pillemer & Suitor, 2006), and the subsequent labor market 
effects and time tradeoffs to being in the caregiver role (Johnson & LoSasso, 2006; Kniesner & 
LoSasso, 2001; Spillman & Pezzin, 2000; Pezzin & Schone, 1999; Ettner, 1996;  Chang & 
White-Means, 1995; Stoller, 1983). Studies indicate a clear hierarchy of caregiver care within 
most families, with a live-in spouse being the primary caregiver if the parent is married, (Schulz 
and Beach, 1999; Stone, Cafferata, & Stangl, 1987) followed by the eldest daughter, who 
oftentimes is the closest, spatially and emotionally, living relative to the patient (Lima et al, 
2008; Lee, Walker, & Shoup, 2001; Yee & Schulz, 2000). With a concentration on these 
caregiver populations, studies emphasize the mental and physical tolls on spouses caring for a 
disabled or dying partner (Ory, 1999; Schulz et al, 1995; Hickenbottom et al., 2002) and the 
various networks of support that are formed around caring for an aging parent amongst siblings, 
not to mention the estimated costs associated with assuming such a role (Hickenbottom et al., 
2002). Recent work examining the extent of informal caregiver networks for the elderly show 
that more than a half of adult-child networks change over a two year period, citing gender 
composition and adult-child availability as the strongest predictors of network change 
(Szinovacz & Davey, 2007).   
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Previous research on caregiver health has examined the psychological consequences, or 
the stress effects, of the role rather than the physical effects (Pinquart & Sorensen, 2007). 
Consistently, studies have shown rises in depression among female adult relatives caring for an 
elder, and increasing emotional distress as level of involvement intensifies. (Lee, Walker, Shoup, 
2001). More recent studies on adult child caregiving using the HRS have started to look at both 
mental and physical health outcomes (Amirkhanyan & Wolf, 2003; Amirkhanyan and Wolf, 
2006; Coe & Van Houtven, 2009). Amirkhanyan and Wolf (2003), using one year of HRS data, 
compared non-caregivers to caregivers to estimate the effects of a having a parent requiring basic 
care needs on depressive outcomes as expressed through differential stress pathways. The 
authors find a strong correlation between the severity of a parent’s special needs and the 
depressive symptoms exhibited by non-caregivers adult children. Because they use only one 
wave of data, the authors can only compare non-caregivers to caregivers at a given point in time. 
In a 2006 study the authors use multiple waves of the HRS to revisit a similar question, the 
manifestation of depression symptoms experienced by adult children of aging parents with 
special care needs, not necessarily in the caregiver role, and find similar results with parental 
disabilities resulting in negative mental outcomes for adult children caregivers and 
noncaregivers. 
 The Coe and Van Houtven (2009) study is the closest to the present study with its 
utilization of multiple panels of the HRS and panel model econometric estimation techniques and 
its examination of several health outcomes. Using the basic needs caregiver questions, the 
authors estimate both the short and long-term health effects of caregiving, looking at self-
assessed, depression, heart disease and high blood pressure for their outcomes. The authors 
control for selection into and out caregiving with family-level characteristics as instruments and 
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estimate their models using lagged dependent variables, allowing them to capture the persistence 
of caregiving on the adult child’s health out two waves from initiation. Coe and Van Houtven 
(2009) find consistently negative persistent effects of caregiving on depressive symptoms for 
married men and women.  
Yet, none of the aforementioned studies make the connection between family dynamics 
and the possible link to intergenerational transfers of health and health behaviors. Kniesner and 
LoSasso (2001) do explore the intergenerational affect of caregiving on labor market outcomes 
and found no effect on adult son’s time allocation to parent, yet adult daughter’s who visited 
parent did reduce their labor market time. Kniesner and LoSasso (2001) use the PSID, however, 
and broadly define caregiving by the number of daily visits made to the parent.  The literature on 
familial interaction and health history and its effects on caregiver health is lacking with regards 
to intergenerational health transfers and parent-adult child relationship, which we attempt to 
explore within this study.  
THE CURRENT STUDY 
This study addresses the causal effect of informal basic needs and financial caregiving 
(and intensity) on self-assessed health, depressive symptoms, vigorous exercise, and smoking. 
According to the stress process model, an adult child caring for an aging parent experiences 
stress that can manifest itself in physical and mental strains to one’s own health, more so then 
those persons who do not take on this role (Amirkhanyan & Wolf, 2003). At the same time, these 
caregivers may gain an acute awareness of their own health and mortality and thus, may be more 
willing to utilize the services of healthcare professionals. I posit that in addition to the caregiver 
stress-induced health effects (Bobinac et al., 2010), an unintended consequence, or spillover, of 
the caregiver time or money transfer is the ability to gain information on the aging process, 
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acquire access to health information that a non-caregiver may not be receiving or is receiving to 
a lesser extent. These spillover effects influence the adult child’s initial health indicators and 
health behaviors and future outcomes. This effect is different than the caregiver effect, direct 
health effects of performing caregiver tasks, or family effects, the warm glow effect of the 
recipient’s improved health on your well-being, which are both also associated with informal 
caregiving (Bobinac et. al, 2010) in that individuals are unaware of this “information spillover” 
effect prior to assuming the caregiver role.   
 It is unclear from the theoretical arguments what effect will dominate; and thus, I test 
empirically the relationships between the informal caregiving role and health outcomes and 
health behaviors. There may be a bimodal effects with the “excellents” on one side of the 
spectrum consisting of adult children who become overly health conscious and invest in 
preventive care given their exposure and interactions with the elderly and aging process, such as 
vigorous exercising; whereas, the “fair/poors” heap at the other end of the health spectrum and 
consist of individuals who have formed a more consequential sense of death and mortality and 
may engage in riskier health behaviors like smoking (Schnoll, Malstrom, & James, 2002). 
Time versus financial transfers and informal caregiving  
All of the studies that have examined the health effects of informal caregiving referenced 
above examined basic needs caregiving, or rather time transfer caregiving. There are several 
different ways that adult children might interact with an elderly parent.  A non-trivial and 
growing sector of the adult population is providing financial assistance and many basic needs 
caregivers also find the role to be an expensive one (Swartz, 2011; Arno, Levine, & Memmott, 
1999). Studies that have examined financial transfers to elderly parents have mainly examined 
the labor market effects (Couch, Daly, & Wolf, 1999)  (e.g. wage rates, hours worked) or the 
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tradeoff between providing time assistance versus financial (Sloan, Zhang, & Wang, 2002; 
Sloan, Picone, & Hoerger, 1997) and the theoretical motivations to provide one transfer versus 
the other (Caputo, 2002; Bernheim, Shleifer, & Summers, 1985). Sloan, Zhang, and Wang 
(2002) find that adult children financial caregivers are less motivated by exchange, then by 
altruism. Their findings also suggest that adult children are substituting one form of transfer for 
another, with higher wage earners more like to provide financial transfers over time. Couch, 
Daly, & Wolf (1999) also find this positive correlation between financial transfers and household 
income. Adult children with money may be financial capable of providing financial transfers to 
pay to avoid having to provide ADL assistance, whereas basic needs caregivers can’t afford to 
pay for help.  
While most survey results indicate negative health effects related to caregiving, these 
results may be biased if the type of caregiving provided is not taken into account and adult health 
is not assessed pre and post-caregiving.  If basic needs caregivers tend to be healthier individuals 
in general as the healthy caregiver hypothesis states, then becoming a caregiving should have 
either no effect or a positive effect on their health behaviors. Whereas, financial caregiving does 
not have the same physical requirements, but can indirectly influence health behaviors when the 
adult child internalizes the associated costs of aging. Therefore, I hypothesize that the basic 
needs caregiving should positively effect both the initial and lagged health behaviors, whereas 
financial caregiving will impact, not initial, but future period health behaviors. 
Why health behaviors? 
No study to my knowledge has studied the relationship of the adult child caregiver role 
on health behaviors.1 I believe these are equally important outcomes to explore along with health 
outcomes, in particular when studying health in a familial context.  Familial studies on health 
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behaviors within an intergenerational context tend to explore the role of genetic endowments 
(Gibbison & Johnson, 2007; Birch & Stoddart, 1991).  Unfortunately the medical history on the 
mother is limited, and information related to specific chronic conditions (e.g. lung disease) is not 
available in the HRS.  Therefore, I posit that engagement with one’s mother via the caregiving 
role and intensity of caregiving provided can serve as a proxy for mother’s health information, 
and the rate and exchange of information regarding the aging process.  
The primary contribution of this paper is to identity a relatively unexplored behavioral 
mechanism in the literature individuals use to make current and future healthcare decisions: 
familial networks, in particular, the transfer of information regarding the aging process from 
parent-child interactions in later life. Understanding how individuals both receive and process 
new information regarding the aging process may help in explaining the decisions influencing 
their own preparations for retirement and old age.  
METHOD 
Data and Sample 
 The sample data comes from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a nationally 
representative biannual survey of older Americans that focuses on their health, retirement, and 
aging lives. The original sample consisted of 51 to 61 year old Americans surveyed in 1992, with 
an over sample of African and Mexican Americans. The original sample consisted of 
approximately 12,500 individuals, 7,600 households, and an 82% response rate. To combat 
sample attrition, the HRS has grown with additional cohorts added in 1998, the Children of the 
Depression (CODA) and War Babies (WBB), and more recently, the Early Baby Boomers 
(EBB) in 2004. Also, in 1998, the HRS merged with the Aging and Health Dynamics Survey 
(AHEAD), a survey of 70 years or older begun in 1993. Important to this study, the survey 
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consists of extensive questioning and tracking of family networks and interactions. Prior to 1996, 
the wording for many of the questions of interest in this analysis including, and most 
importantly, the caregiving question, were different. So for consistency and to hedge against 
biasing the results, I begin my analysis in 1998, following respondents through 2010. My final 
dataset is an unbalanced panel (respondents can appear from 2 to 7 waves), which after 
eliminating respondents with no living mother or maternal figure, those who completed the 
survey via proxy, are currently residing in a nursing home or assisted living facility, and have 
non-missing values on the dependent and key independent variables of interest, yields a final 
maximum sample size of 2,714 men (11,184 person-years) and 4,059 women (20,096 person-
years).  
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are grouped into two categories, health indicators and health 
behaviors. The first health outcome measure, self-assessed health (SAH), is a self-assessed 
measure in which the respondent answered the following 5-point Likert scale question “Would 
you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?” coded 1= excellent, 2=very 
good, 3=good, 4=fair, and 5=poor. A subjective measure of health status, previous research have 
found (Ware and Sherbourne 1992) that SAH does a very good job at predicting future mortality; 
individuals who rate their health excellent/very good tend to live longer on average, than those 
who indicate fair/poor SAH. For the analysis the variable is dummied to equal one if the 
respondent selected fair or poor health. The next health outcomes measure is a measure of mental 
health or depressive symptoms using the Center of Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CESD) 
scale. The scale is comprised of eight questions, six negative measures (feels depressed, 
everything’s an effort, restless sleep, feels lonely, feels sad, could not get going) and two positive 
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(feels happy, enjoys life), which are reverse-coded. The eight questions are summed with higher 
values representing a stronger likelihood of exhibiting depressive symptoms. This is also recoded 
into a binary variable, with all responses four or greater set equal to one. It is believed that the 
CESD does an adequate job of determining depression in an individual and therefore, explains 
the stress the caregiver role places on the adult child (Amirkhanyan & Wolf 2003).  
The two healthy behaviors were chosen both for analytical interests and availability 
within the HRS data. They are also two of the seven Alameda 7 healthy behaviors identified by 
Belloc and Breslow (1973) as necessary inputs in health production2, and the HRS has consistent 
measures for smoking, and vigorous exercise, in all the seven waves. Cigarette smoking is 
important to study given its association with several negative health conditions, including the 
increased probability of lung disease and death. It is also a very costly behavior in practice and 
associated medical costs. Smoking is equal to one if the respondent indicates that they currently 
smoke.  The exercise variable is also coded as binary measure equal to one if the respondent 
replied in the affirmative to working out or participating in physical exercise at least three times 
a week. The inverse relationship between cardiovascular disease, coronary heart disease, and 
physical activity is a common finding in the epidemiology literature. These relationships hold for 
older age groups, and both men and women (Shiroma & Lee, 2010). 
Explanatory Variables 
Caregiver Roles and Intensity of Caregiving 
 The key independent variables are the two caregiver roles. The basic needs caregiver, the 
time transfer role, is coded as a binary dummy variable equal to one if a respondent answered in 
the affirmative to the question, “Did you spend a total of 100 hours or more hours since last 
interview date helping your mother/father with basic personal activities like dressing, eating, and 
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bathing?” and zero otherwise. Using this question as a proxy for caregiver is common in 
caregiver studies using the HRS (Coe & vanHoutven, 2009; A & W, 2003; 2006, Johnson & 
LoSasso, 2000).  
 The financial caregiver variable is coded as a binary dummy variable equal to one if the 
respondent replied yes to the question “Not counting any shared housing or shared food, did you 
give financial help to your mother/father amounting to $500 or more in the last two years?” This 
caregiver requires essentially no interaction with the parent aside from the time cost of arranging 
the monetary transfers. In this study, the financial caregiver role represents a less physically, but 
not necessarily less mentally intensive form of informal caregiving. 
 In order to create the intensity of caregiving provided, respondents were asked to provide 
the total number of hours (money given). First they were asked to give a specific number. If they 
did not enter a specific number, they had to select from a minimum and maximum range of 
values. The median value is assigned to those respondents who choose to only enter in a range.  
Additional Covariates 
I rely on three questions asked in all six waves of interests about the parent, basic needs 
assistance, ability to be left alone, and memory-related disease. Coded as a binary dummy 
variable, parental health equals one if the respondent answered yes to any one of the following 
questions:  “Does she/he [mother/father] need help with basic personal needs like dressing, 
eating, and bathing?” or “Has a doctor ever said that your mother suffered from a memory 
related disease?” and no to “Can she/he [mother/father] be left alone for an hour or more?” The 
mother’s financial state was assessed from two questions. If the respondent either said she owns 
her home or is in the same or better financial situation.  
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Additional parental controls include the mother’s age, and whether the respondent reports 
that she is currently married or has a living spouse. This is important to the analysis because the 
caregiver burden usually falls on the spouse first if the elderly/disabled person is married and 
then to the person’s children (Lima et al, 2008). I include a control for whether the mother is 
living in the respondent’s home. Several studies exist on the power dynamic and cost savings of 
having an elderly parent move into one’s residence as opposed to placing them in a formal care 
facility. This would be the case if, for example, the parent was mentally or physically disabled or 
suffered from a large number of ADLs (McGarry, 1998). There may exist, however, a large 
number of reasons why a respondent could move a parent into their home, such as free or cheap 
child care to grandchildren.  
Remaining covariates are consists of the adult child’s age, the number of living children 
and siblings, and whether the respondent indicates working full-time. Time spent assisting an 
aging parent significantly reduces time both male and female workers invest in the labor market 
(Johnson & LoSasso, 2000). Also, there are controls for whether the adult child has any health 
insurance (e.g. public, private, employer-provided) and a continuous logged measure for 
household wealth.  All regressions are run separately by gender, as women are more likely to 
take on the caregiver role given their kin-keeper and care provider in traditional society 
(Sarkisian & Gerstel, 2004; Moen, Robison, & Dempster-McClain, 1995), and by current marital 
status with individuals in married or partnered relationships grouped together. Married 
households have two adults that can potentially share in the household and caregiver duties (Coe 
& Van Houtven, 2009; Stoller, 1983). All time invariant measures are not included in the final 
regressions as they get dropped as result of the fixed effects regression (discussed below). 
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However, I do include respondent’s educational attainment, race, nativity, and religion in the 
descriptive statistics table.  
Conceptual Framework and Estimation Strategy 
The theory behind the current analysis is derived from Grossman’s health production 
function (1972) based within the framework of Becker’s (1965) household production model, in 
which individuals invests their inputs in the household technology to determine levels of labor 
supply, health, fertility, household arrangements, etc.  The health production function deviates 
only slightly from the Becker model in that now the individual combines market and non-market 
inputs in conjunction with their household production function to yield output, good health.  
An individual’s production function is determined in my model by caregiver status, extent of 
parental needs, health insurance status, age, and labor market and household characteristics that 
are also correlated with the depreciation of health stock over time. Individuals maximize their 
utility functions subject to both money and time constraints. In addition to the health outcomes, I 
also examine whether caregiving influences health behaviors. 
 To estimate the relationship between the caregiver roles, health, and healthy behaviors I 
estimate a multivariate linear regression model to examine trends in health status and health 
behaviors before and after adult children assume the caregiver role. With the use of panel level 
data, I am able to use individual respondents as their own control with the inclusion of individual 
fixed effects. Additionally, because respondents are experiencing transitions into caregiving at 
different times over the course of the ten year period, I include time fixed effects to remove any 
variation resulting from new cohorts being rolled into the sample as a feature of the study design. 
The regression model for assessing the initial effect of caregiving is of the form: 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ  ߚଵ ൅ ן௜ + ߜ௧  ൅  ߚଶ ܾݏܿܿ݃ݒݎ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷ ݂݅݊ܿ݃ݒݎ௜௧ ൅ ܲܺ݅ݐ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺ௧ ൅  ߝ௜௧   (1) 
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Where ௜ܻ௧ represents the health outcome or healthy behavior of individual i=1,…,N  in year 
t=1,…T, ߜ௧ is the control for each year, ܿ݃ݒݎݏݐܽݐ௜௧ is caregiver status (basic, financial, or both) 
in year t, PXit  are the parental characteristics, ௜ܺ௧, are the respondent’s characteristics including 
the health stock measure, and ߝ௜௧  is the error term. Lastly, ן௜ is an indicator for each individual 
in the sample, and controls for unique differences between people. It will be the sign and point 
estimate on the caregiver role, ߚଵ, of most interest in this study.  
I conclude with examining if there is lagged impact of caregiving on the dependent 
variables is similar to (1), except health in the current period is regressed on a lagged caregiver 
measure, ߚହ ܾݏܿܿ݃ݒݎ௜௧ିଵ and ߚ଺ ݂݅݊ܿ݃ݒݎ௜௧ିଵ for two years later (the following survey wave)
3. 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ  ߚସ ൅ ן௜ + ߜ௧  ൅  ߚହ ܾݏܿܿ݃ݒݎ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺ ݂݅݊ܿ݃ݒݎ௜௧ିଵ ൅  ܲܺ݅ݐ  ൅ ߛ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧   (2) 
This model tests lagged effect having been a (money/time) caregiver in time t-1. The coefficient 
estimates on the lagged caregiver variables in models (2), ߚହ and  ߚ଺, will capture this 
unintended spillover effect of health information in the future.  
Reverse Causality Concerns 
Even though fixed effects regression models control for unobserved heterogeneity within 
individuals, it cannot address the potential problem of reserve casuality, adult children select into 
caregiving because of their health. The hypothesis that caregiving is actually positively related to 
health outcomes has previously been proposed in the literature as the healthy caregiver 
hypothesis model (HCH) (Fredman et al., 2008). In order to address this issue, I also run all 
models on a restricted sample of respondents who indicate that they did not experience any 
chronic health conditions or health limitations prior to caregiving. Healthy sample regression 
estimates are presented alongside all full sample estimates for comparison.  
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RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Examining the caregiver roles by sex and marital status in Figure 1 reveals that within 
this sample, married (9.8%) and unmarried (12%) women are far more likely to be basic needs 
caregivers than men (7% and 4.9%),  and unmarried women more so than married. Married men 
are the least likely to be a basic needs caregiver to an aging mother. The opposite is true when it 
comes to the financial caregiver role with unmarried (15.9%) and married men (11.6%) leading 
this group, and married women (11.2) being the least likely to report being a financial caregiver. 
We can also see from the chart, that there is increased chance of being a financial caregiver 
amongst adult children who already report being a basic needs caregiver, in particular for 
unmarried men, with close to 46% of basic needs caregivers self-reporting that they also provide 
financial assistance. The opposite relationship is not as pronounced with financial caregivers 
providing on average between 20 to 28% of basic needs care in the female sample, and 12 to 
21% in the men’s sample.  
   [Figure 1 about here] 
Table 1 presents additional descriptive statistics of our caregiver samples, including 
sample means on the caregiver intensity variables. Not surprisingly, unmarried adult children 
provide more hours of basic needs assistance on average per study period than married children, 
and unmarried women (662 hours) more than unmarried men (507 hours). There are more 
unmarried male basic needs caregivers who also provide financial assistance compared to 
married men and unmarried women, yet no significant difference in the amount of financial 
assistance provide by marital status or between men and women. Among financial caregivers, 
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there are no statistically significant differences in the amount of financial assistance provided for 
women. Married male caregivers do give more at the upper tail of the distribution than women. 
    [Table 1 about here] 
 Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics for the total sample data and by caregiver status. In 
general, non-caregivers are in better health than both basic needs and financial caregivers in the 
subjective health measures, reporting higher self-assessed health scores and score lower on the 
CES-D scale. The distribution of the CESD score index is heavily skewed, with most 
respondents reporting zero or at most one depressive symptom. On average, non-basic needs 
caregivers exercise more often than caregivers, and financial caregivers exercise more than those 
who do not provide financial assistance. They also smoke less compared to basic needs 
caregivers and non-caregivers. Less than one quarter of the respondents in the sample currently 
smoke; however, close to 40 percent of the individuals in each group report exercising more than 
three times a week. The basic descriptive data suggests that basic needs caregivers are in poorer 
health, and the financial caregivers practice positive health behaviors.  
    [Table 2 about here] 
The mothers of the basic needs caregivers are more likely to have ADLs and are slightly 
older, with the average age in the mid eighties. Most of the sample report that their mother’s 
financial situation is either as good as or better than their own or that she owns her home. When 
delineated by caregiver type, however, non-caregiver averages are higher in both groups.  
The majority of the mothers have completed as least a high school degree across all caregiver 
groups; less than a fifth of the sample indicate that their mother is currently married. 
Women, in general, are over represented in the sample, comprising close to sixty percent, 
and over two-thirds of the total sample is married. The sample is mostly white, 81%, and 8% 
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black, 7% Hispanic, and 2.4% are classified as non-Hispanic other. Close to nine percent of the 
sample is foreign born and over 75% have at least a high school degree. Financial caregivers are 
more likely to be employed full-time and have higher average net wealth than non-caregivers. In 
general, financial caregivers appear to be the most economically and socially advantaged, while 
the basic needs caregivers are in poorer health. 
Initial Effects of Informal Caregiving and Caregiving Intensity on Health Outcomes  
Tables 3 list the coefficient estimates for model (1). Panel A includes the binary caregiver 
results and Panel B the intensity of caregiving regression output. Conditional on all covariates 
(listed in Appendix A), we see that basic needs caregiving negatively impacts the health of 
unmarried women, and it also increases their chances of being diagnosed with depressive 
symptoms. When the sample is restricted to the healthy sample pre-caregiving, the relationships 
are no longer significant. This same relationship is evident for unmarried male basic needs 
caregivers. In the full sample the relationship is statistically significant, but is no longer once 
unhealthy men pre-caregiving are removed from the sample.  
Turning to the financial caregiver results, among the sample that was healthy at outset, 
unmarried women who provide financial caregiving demonstrate higher levels of depression. 
Whereas married men who become a financial caregiver are less likely to report poor health. In 
the healthy sample, however, the effect is not significant. Results suggest that at initial onset of 
informal basic needs and financial caregiving, unmarried women who are basic needs caregivers 
exhibit negative health outcomes. Comparatively, the relationship between male caregiver types 
and health outcomes is weaker.   
The fact that all the significant relationships no longer exists in the healthy sample does 
provide additional evidence that there may be selection into the caregiver role based on one’s 
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health, in particular among unmarried adult children. This findings supports both theoretical and 
empirical research that finds adult children with the fewest time constraints and in poorer health 
(contrary to the HCH model), have a higher probability of informal caregiving. 
 [Table 3 about here] 
The intensity of basic needs caregiving provided, as measured by the number of hours 
spent providing assistance, is found to negatively impact the health of unmarried women and 
increase depressive symptoms of both unmarried women and men. In the healthy sample, the 
intensity of basic needs assistance positively impacts reporting poor health for married men. 
None of the effects of financial assistance and health outcomes are significant, with the 
exception of the married women in the healthy sample, for who is it increases the chance of 
reporting depressive symptoms. This suggests that there may be potential psychological effects 
of financially supporting your mother in the initial period. 
Initial Effects of Informal Caregiving and Caregiving Intensity on Health Behaviors  
The next set of results presented in Table 4 examines the relationship of informal 
caregiver type on vigorous exercise and smoking behavior. The estimates indicates that the initial 
effect of informal caregiving, both basic needs and financial, on health behaviors are weak. Basic 
needs caregiving increases engagement in a positive health behavior, vigorous exercise, for 
married and unmarried men in the full sample and both married and unmarried women in the 
restricted healthy sample. There is a positive effect on smoking, a negative health behavior, for 
married male basic needs caregivers, which remains significant in both sample specifications.   
[Table 4 about here] 
As hypothesized there are no initial effects of financial caregiving or the amount of 
financial assistance on either positive or negative health behaviors for women, and a weakly 
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positive effect of exercise for unmarried men. The amount of assistance provided also effects 
engagement in health behaviors, with a positive relationship between hours of basic needs 
assistance provided and exercising for married women and men. And similar to becoming a basic 
needs caregiver, the number of basic needs hours is positively related to engaging in smoking 
behavior among married men.  
Lagged Effects of Informal Caregiving and Caregiving Intensity on Health Outcomes and Health 
Behaviors 
I turn now to my final analyses to assess whether the impact of basic needs or financial 
caregiving manifest into the next period.  Table 5 lists the coefficient estimates for the caregiver 
variables testing model (2) for both the health outcomes and health behaviors. Being a basic 
needs caregiver does have some residual effects on health outcomes for married men two years 
out, with an increase in depressive symptoms.  Married women basic needs caregivers in the 
healthy sample also are more likely to smoke. The lagged effect of intensity of basic needs 
caregiving does not have any significant relationship with health outcomes or health behaviors, 
with the exception of unmarried women in the healthy sample who have an increased probability 
of smoking at least two years out.  
 [Table 5 about here] 
Comparatively, being a financial caregiver has more significant effects on health in the 
lagged models than basic needs caregiving. Unmarried men and women experience an increase 
in depression by becoming an informal financial caregiver, and married men exercise more. 
These very same relationships also correspond to the amount of financial assistance provided, 
listed in Panel B of Table 5. The amount of financial assistance provided increases the likelihood 
of unmarried men reporting depressive symptoms and decreases the chances unmarried women 
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report poor health. These findings suggest that the monetary toll of caregiving can influence 
adult children’s health outcomes, in particular those not currently in a marital union. 
DISCUSSION 
 The decision to provide assistance to aging parents is the subject of a large literature that 
cuts across disciplines, as is the psychological, social, and physical health outcomes of those 
participating in this relationship dynamic. I hypothesized that the type and intensity of caregiving 
would impact health behaviors in addition to health outcomes not only in the present period, but 
also in future periods. The results from the study suggest depressive symptoms increase among 
unmarried basic needs caregivers, but that they may be selecting into that role because of their 
poor health. Married women who assume a caregiving role for an elderly mother experience an 
increased probability of smoking over time. While for unmarried men becoming a financial 
caregiver elevates their likelihood of exhibiting depressive symptoms. The fact that I find 
differences by marital status may suggest that marriage provide a buffer to caregiver stress and 
poor health outcomes for adult children.  
It is my belief that the primary contribution of this paper is to identity a relatively 
unexplored behavioral mechanism in the literature that individuals use to make current and 
future healthcare decisions, familial networks, and in particular, the transfer of information 
regarding the aging process from parent-child interactions in later life. Not only is the caregiver 
role an onerous one, but it takes on many forms, and contributes to the exchange of information 
from both parent to child and child to parent. How individuals use information, in particular, 
family health information remains understudied. Previous studies suggest that adult child 
caregivers do make conscious decisions between providing care to an elderly parent and the type 
of care provided and these decisions are influenced by familial and labor market, and potential 
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health-related considerations. The findings from this analysis, when the full sample results were 
compared with the healthy sample also support this research. Therefore, the type of caregiver 
role assumed could be driving the differential health and behavioral outcomes in this study. 
While fixed effects modeling will reduce the potential bias introduced by changes an individual’s 
familial, labor, or previous health status over time, it wouldn’t be able to account for the 
caregiver role selection. Future research should examine the selection into the type of caregiver 
roles and its effect on health outcomes and health behaviors.  
My study is not without limitations. The first concerns the timing of the caregiving 
episode. Model (1) claims to capture an initial effect of caregiving, however, the survey question 
asks about a two-year period prior to the interview. The estimation techniques may not picking 
up immediate effects due to the biannual nature of the dataset, and the lagged effect model (2), 
could be upwards of four years since initial caregiving begin. Second, my analysis summarizes 
intensity of caregiving provided, rather than an assessment of continuous caregiving. There is 
evidence to suggest that duration of caregiving matters for health outcomes (Coe & van Houtven, 
2009; Bertrand et al., 2012), and should be analyzed in future studies.  
My study suggest that the effects of caregiving not only manifest from assisting an 
elderly parent with ADLs, but can also weigh on children due to the potential unintended costs of 
taking on the role of financial caregiver. There have been recent calls for American policy 
makers to discuss assisting American families with the costs of elder care (Swartz, 2011), 
however, it runs counter to societal belief that there is less need for financial assistance given the 
existence of Medicaid, which already covers long-term expenditures for the elderly. It is my 
hope that future research will be more sensitive to the role of financial caregiving and it roles on 
the caregiver’s health and health behaviors. The changing age structure of American society, 
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coupled with time and monetary constraints placed on American households, will definitely 
make studying familial caregiving an important area of study for the foreseeable future. 
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Table 1. Sample Descriptives on Caregiver Type and Intensity of Caregiving Among Only Caregivers
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Basic Needs Caregivers:
Total Hours of Basic Needs Caregiving 661.832 1263.709 * 518.863 835.666 506.808 757.595 * 380.952 603.919
Basic Needs Hours: less than 200 0.188 0.391 0.213 0.410 0.164 0.372 * 0.369 0.483
Basic Needs Hours: 200 to less than 500 0.353 0.478 0.359 0.480 0.338 0.475 * 0.276 0.447
Basic Needs Hours: More than 500 0.459 0.499 * 0.428 0.495 0.498 0.502 * 0.355 0.479
Provides financial assistance to mother 0.286 0.452 0.224 0.417 0.458 0.500 * 0.280 0.449
Total Amount of Financial Assistance given 3,696 5,823 5,726 12,175 3,682 3,488 3,989 6,234
Financial Aid: None 0.714 0.452 * 0.776 0.417 0.542 0.500 * 0.720 0.449
Financial Aid: less than $1000 0.070 0.256 0.053 0.224 0.107 0.310 0.050 0.219
Financial Aid: $1000 to less than $5000 0.120 0.325 0.099 0.299 0.177 0.383 * 0.141 0.348
Financial Aid: More than $5000 0.096 0.295 0.072 0.258 0.174 0.381 * 0.089 0.284
Financial Caregivers:
Total Amount of Financial Assistance given 3,500 11,443 3,520 7,412 4,035 11,942 3,599 5,944
Financial Aid: less than $1000 0.289 0.454 0.281 0.450 0.227 0.419 0.226 0.418
Financial Aid: $1000 to less than $5000 0.466 0.499 0.508 0.500 0.481 0.500 * 0.526 0.500
Financial Aid: More than $5000 0.245 0.430 0.211 0.408 0.292 0.455 * 0.248 0.432
Provides basic needs assistance to mother 0.282 0.450 0.196 0.397 0.205 0.404 * 0.117 0.321
Total Hours of Basic Needs Caregiving 658.326 1325.870 * 458.772 758.793 342.559 217.784 * 417.972 626.875
Basic Needs Hours: None 0.718 0.450 * 0.804 0.397 0.795 0.404 * 0.883 0.321
Basic Needs Hours: less than 200 0.043 0.203 0.035 0.184 0.021 0.144 * 0.033 0.179
Basic Needs Hours: 200 to less than 500 0.085 0.280 0.069 0.254 0.076 0.265 * 0.029 0.167
Basic Needs Hours: More than 500 0.154 0.361 * 0.092 0.289 0.108 0.311 * 0.055 0.228
Note: Data are from HRS, 1998-2010; Weighted Sample Means; Dollar amount in $2008; * denotes significant difference within sex between unmarried and married is 
statistically significant at the 5% level; underlining denotes difference within marital status between women and men at 5% level
Women Men
Unmarried Married Unmarried Married
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables, Model Covariates, Mother and Respondent Characteristics, by Caregiver Status
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Health Outcomes and Health Behaviors
In fair/poor health 0.203 0.402 0.230 0.421 0.188 0.391 *** 0.213 0.410 0.196 0.397 ***
Depressed (CESD>4) 0.376 0.624 0.440 0.660 0.346 0.603 *** 0.406 0.641 0.362 0.615 ***
Vigorous Activity 0.350 0.477 0.340 0.474 0.356 0.479 ** 0.360 0.480 0.347 0.476 ***
Current Smoker 0.172 0.377 0.181 0.385 0.170 0.376 0.171 0.376 0.175 0.380
Mother's Characteristics
Mother requires basic needs assistance, can't be 
left alone, or has memory related disease 0.197 0.398 0.314 0.464 0.149 0.356 *** 0.233 0.423 0.187 0.390 ***
Mother own home or is in a better financial 
situation than respondent 0.702 0.457 0.656 0.475 0.723 0.447 *** 0.617 0.486 0.742 0.438 ***
Mother lives with respondent 0.046 0.209 0.085 0.279 0.029 0.167 *** 0.084 0.277 0.030 0.170 ***
Mother married 0.187 0.390 0.126 0.332 0.220 0.414 *** 0.149 0.356 0.209 0.407 ***
Mother has at least high school degree 0.860 0.347 0.839 0.367 0.872 0.334 *** 0.836 0.370 0.873 0.333 ***
Mother's age 83.281 7.214 84.917 6.673 82.643 7.037 *** 83.487 6.781 83.309 7.102 *
Respondent's Characteristics
Female 0.565 0.496 0.718 0.450 0.505 0.500 *** 0.558 0.497 0.579 0.494 ***
Currently married 0.714 0.452 0.667 0.471 0.730 0.444 *** 0.682 0.466 0.723 0.448 ***
Age 60.134 6.477 60.908 6.583 59.553 6.185 *** 59.794 6.219 60.068 6.399 **
Has health insurance 0.760 0.427 0.752 0.432 0.760 0.427 * 0.766 0.424 0.754 0.431 *
Total number of children in household 2.856 1.900 2.846 1.971 2.842 1.864 2.773 1.889 2.874 1.902 **
Total number of living siblings 2.875 2.289 2.719 2.247 2.944 2.301 *** 3.005 2.374 2.813 2.243 ***
Net Wealth 636,261 2,401,562 595,560 2,111,734 652,765 2,543,313 747,058 3,054,873 584,040 2,061,024 ***
Fulltime employed 0.441 0.497 0.358 0.480 0.487 0.500 *** 0.457 0.498 0.441 0.496 ***
Northeast Census Region 0.150 0.357 0.148 0.356 0.149 0.356 0.171 0.376 0.139 0.346 ***
Midwest Census Region 0.261 0.439 0.231 0.421 0.276 0.447 *** 0.209 0.407 0.285 0.451 ***
Southern Census Region 0.382 0.486 0.425 0.494 0.362 0.481 *** 0.400 0.490 0.374 0.484 ***
West Census Region 0.206 0.405 0.195 0.396 0.212 0.409 *** 0.219 0.414 0.201 0.401
Other Region 0.001 0.026 0.001 0.034 0.001 0.022 *** 0.001 0.027 0.001 0.026 **
Additional Characteristics (Time Invariant/Not included in Model)
Less than high school 0.159 0.366 0.170 0.376 0.153 0.360 * 0.150 0.357 0.162 0.369 ***
High school 0.288 0.453 0.300 0.458 0.282 0.450 *** 0.260 0.439 0.300 0.458 ***
Some college 0.269 0.444 0.282 0.450 0.266 0.442 0.278 0.448 0.268 0.443 ***
Bachelors or more 0.283 0.450 0.248 0.432 0.299 0.458 *** 0.312 0.463 0.269 0.444 ***
non-Hispanic Black 0.087 0.281 0.106 0.308 0.078 0.269 *** 0.132 0.339 0.067 0.250 ***
non-Hispanic White 0.817 0.387 0.790 0.407 0.829 0.376 *** 0.734 0.442 0.854 0.353 ***
non-Hispanic Other 0.024 0.154 0.036 0.187 0.018 0.133 *** 0.038 0.190 0.018 0.132 ***
Hispanic 0.072 0.258 0.067 0.250 0.074 0.262 *** 0.096 0.295 0.061 0.239 ***
Foreign born 0.088 0.284 0.073 0.261 0.093 0.291 *** 0.131 0.338 0.067 0.250 ***
No religion 0.090 0.287 0.067 0.251 0.102 0.302 *** 0.080 0.271 0.096 0.295 ***
Observations 27,054 9,120 17,219 8,403 17,936
Note: Data are from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) waves 3-10; Number of observations listed are the maximum number, given that for a few variables there are 
missing values. Asterisks denotes difference in caregiver and non-caregiver group is statistically significant: *** at .1%, ** at 1%, and *** at 5%
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Table 3. The effect of caregiver type and intensity of caregiving on health outcomes from fixed effects regression models
Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried
Panel A. Caregiver Type
Fair/Poor Health
Basic Needs Caregiver -0.009 0.060*** 0.008 0.038 0.023 0.039 0.050 0.021
[0.012] [0.021] [0.018] [0.036] [0.022] [0.046] [0.033] [0.078]
Financial Caregiver -0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.012 -0.029* -0.020 -0.028 0.045
[0.012] [0.023] [0.016] [0.028] [0.017] [0.033] [0.024] [0.035]
Depression (CESD>4)
Basic Needs Caregiver 0.028 0.057* 0.011 0.067 0.030 0.159** -0.008 0.113
[0.022] [0.034] [0.033] [0.069] [0.028] [0.077] [0.048] [0.114]
Financial Caregiver 0.032 0.013 0.056* 0.005 0.002 -0.049 0.047 -0.059
[0.023] [0.035] [0.031] [0.063] [0.022] [0.058] [0.038] [0.090]
Panel B. Intensity of Caregiving
Fair/Poor Health
Hours of basic needs assistance provided (logged) 0.000 0.011*** 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.011* 0.005
[0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] [0.004] [0.008] [0.006] [0.014]
Amount of financial assistance provided (logged) -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.006
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005]
Depression (CESD>4)
Hours of basic needs assistance provided (logged) 0.005 0.010* 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.027** -0.001 0.004
[0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.013] [0.005] [0.013] [0.008] [0.017]
Amount of financial assistance provided (logged) 0.004 -0.001 0.008* -0.003 0.001 -0.006 0.007 0.001
[0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.008] [0.003] [0.008] [0.005] [0.012]
Women Men
Note: Data are from waves 4-10 of the HRS, Robust Standard errors in brackets. All specifications inclues the same covariates listed in Appendix 1; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Cell coefficients represent the marginal effect of caregiver type (caregiver intensity) on the given health outcome.
Full Sample Healthy Sample Full Sample Healthy Sample
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Table 4. The effect of caregiver type and intensity of caregiving on health behaviors from fixed effects regression models
Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried
Panel A. Caregiver Type
Vigorous Exercise
Basic Needs Caregiver 0.013 0.053** 0.058* 0.099* 0.059** 0.116* 0.021 0.158
[0.018] [0.025] [0.031] [0.051] [0.028] [0.065] [0.053] [0.103]
Financial Caregiver 0.017 0.010 -0.001 0.003 0.014 -0.078* -0.014 -0.077
[0.018] [0.026] [0.030] [0.052] [0.023] [0.041] [0.042] [0.074]
Current Smoker
Basic Needs Caregiver 0.005 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.040*** 0.011 0.080** 0.065
[0.007] [0.014] [0.013] [0.023] [0.015] [0.037] [0.032] [0.076]
Financial Caregiver 0.001 -0.004 0.013 -0.015 0.010 0.005 0.016 0.010
[0.008] [0.016] [0.010] [0.024] [0.009] [0.018] [0.018] [0.038]
Panel B. Intensity of Caregiving
Vigorous Exercise
Hours of basic needs assistance provided (logged) 0.001 0.005 0.010* 0.012 0.010* 0.015 -0.001 0.021
[0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.005] [0.011] [0.009] [0.017]
Amount of financial assistance provided (logged) 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.012** -0.003 -0.012
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.015]
Current Smoker
Hours of basic needs assistance provided (logged) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.008*** 0.001 0.015*** 0.008
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.011]
Amount of financial assistance provided (logged) 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005]
Note: Data are from waves 4-10 of the HRS, Robust Standard errors in brackets. All specifications inclues the same covariates listed in Appendix A; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Cell coefficients represent the marginal effect of caregiver type (caregiver intensity) on the given health behavior.
Women Men
Full Sample Healthy Sample Full Sample Healthy Sample
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Table 5. Fixed Effects Regression Estimates of Lagged Caregiver on Health Outcomes and Health Behaviors
Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried
Panel A. Caregiver Type
Fair/Poor Health
Basic Needs Caregiver -0.006 -0.010 0.007 0.030 0.002 -0.075 0.058 -0.126
[0.013] [0.021] [0.017] [0.038] [0.023] [0.056] [0.042] [0.094]
Financial Caregiver 0.008 0.026 0.002 0.053 0.018 0.001 0.035 0.015
[0.013] [0.024] [0.016] [0.042] [0.017] [0.036] [0.025] [0.063]
Depression (CESD>4)
Basic Needs Caregiver 0.022 -0.013 0.031 -0.049 -0.021 0.012 0.009 0.202*
[0.021] [0.034] [0.030] [0.058] [0.029] [0.082] [0.036] [0.122]
Financial Caregiver 0.006 0.099*** 0.052 0.077 0.000 0.091* -0.037 0.242***
[0.023] [0.037] [0.036] [0.069] [0.025] [0.053] [0.043] [0.077]
Vigorous Exercise
Basic Needs Caregiver 0.016 0.009 0.030 0.037 0.021 -0.027 -0.030 0.056
[0.018] [0.024] [0.033] [0.051] [0.029] [0.065] [0.046] [0.104]
Financial Caregiver 0.005 -0.033 -0.007 0.030 0.024 0.028 0.073* 0.061
[0.018] [0.028] [0.029] [0.059] [0.025] [0.044] [0.041] [0.077]
Current Smoker
Basic Needs Caregiver 0.005 0.005 0.024** 0.014 0.004 0.024 0.019 -0.075
[0.006] [0.013] [0.010] [0.029] [0.014] [0.039] [0.031] [0.076]
Financial Caregiver 0.003 -0.016 -0.003 -0.009 0.000 0.019 -0.009 0.033
[0.008] [0.013] [0.013] [0.020] [0.008] [0.023] [0.011] [0.052]
Panel B. Intensity of Caregiving
Fair/Poor Health
Hours of basic needs assistance provided (logged) -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000 -0.012 0.012 -0.025
[0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.007] [0.004] [0.010] [0.007] [0.017]
Amount of financial assistance provided (logged) 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.009* 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.003
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.005] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.009]
Depression (CESD>4)
Hours of basic needs assistance provided (logged) 0.005 -0.004 0.007 -0.006 0.001 -0.002 0.006 0.029
[0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.006] [0.015] [0.008] [0.020]
Amount of financial assistance provided (logged) 0.002 0.012** 0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.013* -0.007 0.034***
[0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.003] [0.007] [0.006] [0.011]
Vigorous Exercise
Hours of basic needs assistance provided (logged) 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.019
[0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.005] [0.012] [0.009] [0.021]
Amount of financial assistance provided (logged) 0.001 -0.005 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.009* 0.001
[0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010]
Current Smoker
Hours of basic needs assistance provided (logged) 0.001 0.002 0.004** 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.013
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.007] [0.008] [0.013]
Amount of financial assistance provided (logged) 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.007]
Note: Data are from waves 4-10 of the HRS, Robust Standard errors in brackets. All specifications inclues the same covariates listed in Appendix 1; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Cell coefficients represent the marginal effect of caregiver type (caregiver intensity) on the given health outcome or behavior.
Women
Full Sample Healthy Sample
Men
Full Sample Healthy Sample
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1 There are a few studies that examine the effect of spousal caregiving on health behaviors (see 
Burton, et al., 1997) 
2 The remaining four healthy behaviors are hours of drinking, sleep, regularity of meals, health 
practices, and BMI. BMI and health practices I’ve included as a health indicators. 
3 Previous runs included a four year model, but due to small sample sizes were not included in 
the current analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
